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Chapter I: Introduction
In 2017, the leaders of rural movements from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Niger, Mali,
Senegal, and Ghana converged in Spain’s Basque region at the annual conference of La Vía
Campesina, a prominent international peasant organization.1 The activists discussed their
campaigns to defend the rights and resources of small farmers in the face of governments
pursuing agro-industrial development projects and the reallocation of sizeable tracts of land to
corporate entities. The representatives were indicative of an increasingly common form of
African peasant politics, namely organized social movements. In this vein, the considerable
presence of African peasant associations at the conference raises questions about small farmers,
some 60% of the sub-Saharan population,2 as political actors on the continent. While esteemed
Africanists and scholars of peasant politics have highlighted the obstacles to collective action for
small farmers, the emergence of more and more peasant movements across Africa shows that
new investigations of peasant collective action are needed. What causes peasants to choose
collective action when making political claims? Where do peasant movements emerge? When do
they engage broad-based and diverse rural populations? These are the questions from which this
study departs.
I have tried to illuminate the political activities of small farmers in Africa by testing a
hypothesis holding, in essence, that state intervention in agrarian economies causes peasant
movements to engage in broad-based contention, on regional and national levels. The study
traces the connections between government land and agricultural institutions and the

La Vía Campesina, “African peasants highlight their struggles at La Vía Campesina global conference,” July 21,
2017. Accessed April 24, 2019: https://viacampesina.org/en/african-peasants-highlight-struggles-via-campesinaglobal-conference/
2
“Rural Population (% of total): sub-Saharan Africa ,” the World Bank: Data, accessed December 11, 2018,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?contextual=default&locations=ZG&name_desc=false
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characteristics of rural movements that make claims on them. Case studies of regions of
Tanzania, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia show the ways in which rural movements are
constructed in response to the political and social environments in which they arise. That is, the
comparisons demonstrate that the character of political authority and social organization are
important determinants of the form taken by peasant movements.
Starting from my hypothesis, I construct an argument as to how statist land tenure and
agricultural systems interact with social structures to cause peasants to adopt ethnically inclusive
political identities and scaled-up contestation strategies, terms which I define below. The study
shows that the systems used to govern rural resources and the social organization of rural groups
profoundly influence the essential characteristics of peasant movements. In this sense, the study
investigates two independent variables, one that is intrinsic to the nation-state and one that is
intrinsic to rural societies, in order to explain the political activities of small farmers in Africa.
Since 60% of the sub-Saharan population in 2017 lived in rural areas, 3 the institutions which
govern land and agriculture - the bases of economic activity for that sizeable population - are
critical to understanding African politics and development.
The case study comparisons made here shed light on an under-analyzed and undertheorized dynamic of peasant-state relations in Africa: the conditions (1) under which peasant
political action reaches up to directly challenge the highest levels of national authority and (2)
under which narrow ethnic identities are supplanted by more encompassing ones. I show over the
course of this essay that such outcomes depend on the interaction between modernizing statemanaged rural economic institutions and the structure of the traditional agrarian societies that
encounter them. Building off of the work of Catherine Boone on land tenure systems, this paper

“Rural Population (% of total): sub-Saharan Africa ,” the World Bank: Data, accessed December 11, 2018,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?contextual=default&locations=ZG&name_desc=false
3
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presents evidence for a theory of the scaling-up and broadening of African peasant political
activity. The cases are of confrontation, ranging from concerted electoral challenges to armed
rebellion, between rural groups and national authority.
Terminology
Before introducing the hypothesis and theoretical framework, it is necessary to define the
key terms used throughout the study. I define a “land tenure regime” as the set of formal and
informal institutions and laws that govern land and are used to resolve conflicts over it. In a
strictly legal sense, these systems are distinguished as either statist or neo-customary, to use
Boone’s categories. Statist land tenure regimes are governed by secular agents of the state,
ordinary bureaucrats, sometimes with the help and oversight of locally elected representatives,
and are therefore referred to as a form of direct rule over land. Neo-customary land tenure
regimes invest power in chiefs and other traditional authorities to govern land access. I consider
these to be a form of indirect rule over land, in the sense that intermediaries, wielding some
degree of personally specific authority, are used by the central state to govern in its place. 4 In
theory, the two types of land tenure regimes produce different “political effects,” another term
used frequently here which simply refers to a manifestation of political activity. For simplicity, I
also use “outcomes” interchangeably with “political effects” throughout the essay. The two
political effects with which this study is primarily concerned are the “political identity” and
“contestation strategy” of peasants. Political identity is the identity an individual or group uses to
give coherence and rhetorical weight to political claims. Political identity may take ethnic,
regional, and/or national forms, for example. Contestation strategies are the tactics used to make
those claims. In the arena of land politics, they range from lobbying a local leader individually

Catherine Boone and Lydia Nyeme, “Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania,”
Comparative Politics 48, no. 1 (2015), 69-70.
4
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for more land to mobilizing across villages and jurisdictions to pressure the state for changes to
the way land is allocated. Relating these terms, Boone argues that neo-customary systems
accentuate ethnic political identities and village-level contestation and that statist regimes foster
non-ethnic, modern political identities and regional and national forms of contestation.5
Finally, the analyses of the effect of group social structure on peasant movements
frequently use the descriptors “hierarchical” and “egalitarian.” By a hierarchical society, I mean
one that is characterized by social differentiation and inequality, with leaders that control subject
populations. I also describe hierarchical societies as being “centralized,” or having some degree
of concentrated political power in particular leaders or institutions, such as organized religious
orders. Egalitarian societies, which are referred to as “decentralized,” do not have leaders who
dominate or control other community members and have a more equal organization of society.
They are called decentralized for the lack of prominent leaders and institutions wielding power
over the collective. Government in egalitarian societies may be communal and/or loosely
constructed. I also use the term “acephalous” to refer to egalitarian groups.
Question
Far more land in sub-Saharan Africa is governed under neo-customary regimes than
under statist ones and prominent works such as Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject and Lund’s Local
Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa have analyzed rural politics under the former.
Moreover, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania by Hyden, The State in Africa by Bayart, and No
Condition is Permanent by Berry have examined the day-to-day tactics used by individual and
small groups of peasants to defend themselves against and negotiate with overbearing states.
While these contributions and others have covered the most common forms of African peasant

5

Boone and Nyeme, “Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa,” 69-70.
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politics and land institutions, analyses of collective peasant movements and statist land tenure
systems are both lacking. Though it is more common for peasants to “avoid the state by taking
refuge in alternatives that are clearly second best,”6 I have focused on cases of organized
collective action to better understand when peasants seek to make a systemic impact and are not
limited by “second best” tactics.
To fill this knowledge gap, I have attempted to answer the following: Under what
conditions do ethnically diverse groups of peasants join collectively to challenge and assert
claims on the central state? The analytic emphasis throughout this study is thus on explaining
the form that peasant political activity takes, though I have taken care to explain the processes
leading to mobilization in each of the core cases. By analyzing episodes of broad-based and
scaled-up peasant contention in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia, I defend my argument that
state involvement in land allocation and agriculture interacts with group social structure to
influence the forms of peasant collective action, in what I believe is a theoretical contribution to
the study of African peasant and land politics.
Hypothesis
The hypothetical framework set forth here draws on Boone’s theory of the political
incentives of statist or direct rule land tenure regimes, which I elaborate on below, and augments
it by explaining the effect of the social structure of agrarian groups on outcomes for peasant
political activity. Following Boone, direct rule of land and agriculture incentivizes peasants (1)
to assert their claims on a regional and national scale, through collective action and in institutions
above the level of the village and (2) to adopt political identities that are more inclusive than
ethnicity. The first outcome should occur because direct rule of the rural economy leads

6

Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 87.
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contentious peasants to pressure the state as the authority over land and agricultural resources,
making mass-mobilization and collective action useful strategies for waging rural political
claims. Since the state is the target to which land and agricultural claims must be directed,
movements will seek to exert pressure on it. Aggrieved peasants therefore have a reason to form
wide-ranging, noisy protest movements and to pursue claims in higher-level arenas, such as
courts and elections. The second outcome predicted by the hypothesis is based on reasoning that
direct rule of land, by secular agents of the state, disregards ethnic claims to land. In contrast to
traditional leaders that allocate land according to group-insider status, keeping the resource to
members of the ethnic group and the traditional community, statist institutions de-emphasize
ethnicity when distributing land. The absence of an ethnic basis for land claims pushes peasants
to adopt political identities that are more salient and that can be used to unify ethnically diverse
movements to contest the state’s management of land.
This institutional theory of the political effects of statist land tenure systems is, however,
incomplete. It explains how statist institutions cause peasant movements to adopt encompassing
political identities and to challenge state power, but it falls short in explaining where such
institutions take hold in emerging states. A predictive understanding of peasant movements then
requires an understanding of the patterns of state-building; knowing where strong statist
institutions are likely to develop, one can in turn better predict where broad-based peasant
movements are likely to occur. To this end, I seek to deepen the explanatory power of Boone’s
institutional theory of peasant movements by synthesizing it with a focus on the social
underpinnings of African state-building.
A more complete theory should account for the way in which the presence or absence of
powerful local leaders, sitting atop a social hierarchy, influence the extension of the state’s
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authority and its relationship with rural populations. Because the social characteristics of rural
groups, such as their degree of centralization and historical inequality, shape the penetration of
statist rural institutions, they ultimately shape outcomes for peasant politics. Imposing statist
institutions is a challenging task for budding governments, made all the more difficult when done
in the face of jealous and powerful regional leaders. The extent to which the state operates in
practice as the authority over land is contingent on the existence of local, traditional leaders
whose own authority may rival that of the state. Prominent local leaders are likely to become
mediators between nascent or weak bureaucracies, looking to consolidate order with the help of
influential locals, and rural populations. In mediating between their peasant clients and the state,
local leaders directly shape the way in which developing state policies and resources are
respectively implemented and allocated. Ingratiating themselves with the state in turn helps local
leaders to maintain their own authority and to displace the state as the target of claims.
It is on these grounds that I argue that the social structure of a rural group is
determinative of the forms of peasant political activity that emerge to make claims under statist
land tenure systems. Where powerful local leaders are able to mediate between rural populations
and the state and to assume powers over agricultural resource allocation, peasants belonging to
hierarchical groups are likely to direct their claims to these figures, meaning that contestation
will not scale up to put pressure on the state and that ethnic identities will continue to be
meaningful in land and agricultural claims. Moreover, traditional leaders are often able to
suppress peasants from joining together by relying on forbidding institutions, social norms, and
ideologies that justify the docility of subjects. The ability of local leaders to control their subjects
makes them a generally attractive ally for states seeking to consolidate their authority and
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therefore hierarchical groups are more likely to be given compensatory access to the state’s
political and economic resources.
To develop a theoretical framework of labelled outcomes, we expect the containment of
contestation, meaning that local leaders either suppress peasant collective action or remain the
target of claims, when hierarchical societies encounter statist rural economic regimes. Just as
contention should not broaden its scope under such circumstances, political identities will
continue to be narrow or ethnically exclusive as well. Ethnicity and communal belonging should
remain a salient force for peasants seeking to sway traditional leaders who mediate conflicts over
land and agriculture on behalf of the state.
While hierarchical groups are more readily incorporated into the state’s politicaleconomic order, egalitarian or acephalous groups, lacking intermediaries, are unlikely to
command the organizational force to do so. Unconstrained by powerful regional challengers,
state-builders can more easily impose statist land and agricultural systems directly on the
countryside. As a result, there is a much higher likelihood of close contact between the state and
the rural population. In a statist institutional environment, peasants must pressure the state
directly when grievances arise, instead of appealing to local notables. To this end, egalitarian
groups use contestation strategies that go beyond local boundaries to target regional and national
authorities. We expect to see the upscaling of contestation when a fragmented, decentralized
group mobilizes to make claims on a statist regime. With contention transcending the boundaries
of ethnic communities, political identities will also become ethnically inclusive, grouping
together diverse claimants and taking on regionalist or nationalist forms. These outcomes are
arrayed in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: Framework of Peasant Politics under Statist Economic Systems
Statist Rural Economic Regime

Hierarchical/Centralized Group

Egalitarian/Decentralized Group

Given conditions for
mobilization

Given conditions for
mobilization
- Containment of contestation
- Ethnically exclusive political
identities

- Upscaling of contestation
- Ethnically inclusive political
identities

Figure 1 is intended to serve as an organizing schematic for peasant political outcomes. It
visualizes the interaction between modernizing statist land and agricultural regimes and rural
societies. The framework is based on the arguments made here that centralized/hierarchical and
decentralized/egalitarian societies differ in their capacity to shield their populations from the
reach of modern states. Leaders of hierarchical societies are better able to ally themselves with
state elites and are consequently better able to shape the effects of state penetration, which
directly impacts peasant political outcomes. The result of this process is a characteristic
compromise of African state-building, in which local leaders retain status and authority in
exchange for allegiance to the central state and acceptance of its political-economic order. As
traditional authorities mediate between the state and their peasant subjects, the politics of the
latter continue to adhere to traditional forms. On the other hand, egalitarian groups are in general
unable to initially counteract the imposition of statist institutions; African state-builders usually
meet less concerted resistance from decentralized groups than from centralized ones, enabling
them to construct institutions with direct control over land allocation and agriculture. The
political activity of peasants then will correspondingly target the higher-level, delocalized, and
13

de-ethnicized governments they seek to challenge in moments of contention. The framework,
therefore, highlights the socio-political factors, captured in the hierarchy/centralization –
equality/decentralization variable, which determine state penetration. Once the degree of state
penetration is ascertained, one can make more accurate predictions about the characteristics of
peasant movements. In this way, the framework provides a fuller account of where high-level,
multiethnic peasant movements are likely to emerge, with greater explanatory capacity than a
purely institutional model.
The framework in Figure 1, however, can only partly explain the characteristics of
peasant contention. It lays the foundation for more in depth explanations for the scope and
inclusivity of peasant movements, which must be developed from analyses of specific
configurations of state and traditional power. Between variations in statist rural regimes and in
the degree of centralization or fragmentation, such configurations cannot be reduced to a single
schematic. In this sense, the framework can be used to guide individual analyses of the interplay
between nationalizing states and localizing traditional orders and to inform predictions about
how that interplay will impact on the characteristics of peasant politics. The framework provides
predictive guidelines for analysts to construct country- and region-specific predictions about the
potential form of rural movements. The case studies analyzed here conform generally to the
framework, while also demonstrating the complexity of interactions between the key statist
regime and group hierarchy variables.
Explaining the Mobilization of Peasants
Though this paper primarily makes an argument as to what form peasant movements
take, each case study also analyzes the conditions that led peasants to engage in contentious
political activity in the first place. To organize these analyses, I have relied on the social
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movement framework in Dynamics of Contention by Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow, and
Charles Tilly.7 While their work covers the full trajectory of social movements, I have used their
model of the initial mobilization process to augment the case studies. Their framework conforms
to the standard or “classical” social movement model, but aims to exchange a static conception
of mobilization for one emphasizing more dynamic interaction between actors. They modify the
classic terminology to reflect the dynamism they hope to introduce into theoretical models of
social movements, for example, exchanging the more determined “opportunity structure” for the
more uncertain process of “attribution of opportunity and threat.”
Following McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, mobilization begins to emerge when social
change processes produce threats to and political opportunities for contentious actors. Groups
that have perceived threats and political opportunities are primed to initiate and respond to
mobilization efforts. Within a newly contestable political environment, actors tap into social
networks, in what they refer to as social appropriation, to organize those politically enlivened
group members who have encountered threats and/or opportunities. Whether through existing or
newly created associations, actors rely on connections to the broader community to bring new
members into action. From these organizational sites, groups plan and undertake collective
actions, such as mass protests, boycotts, and land occupations. In the descriptive sections of the
case studies, I explain the emergence of rural movements using these concepts.
Historical Context: The Evolution of Land Tenure Laws in Africa
Before analyzing the effect of the state’s control of land on peasant politics, it is
necessary to prepare by reviewing the history of land governance in post-colonial Africa. While
there is considerable cross- (and intra-) country variation in land tenure regimes, it is possible to

7

Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 38-50.
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identify regional trends, stemming from colonial experiences, in their legal form. In emphasizing
trends in the legal or formal aspects of land tenure regimes, I intend to make clear that these
aspects, despite regional similarities, often contradict the actual authorities and institutions that
govern access to land. While statist laws tended to be popular at independence, they were often
obstructed or coopted by traditional authorities, which meant that in practice neo-customary
regimes were used to govern far more land than statist ones.8 Beginning in the 1990s with
democratization and the adoption of neoliberal structural adjustment programs, there emerges a
continent-wide, donor-driven shift in land laws towards privatization that continues to this day.
Against these top-down efforts, simultaneous decentralization processes stymied the shift to
privatization while other actors have advocated for reforms that prioritize use rights of smallholders or communal rights.
Throughout Francophone West Africa, most newly independent states formally
established systems of direct rule of land, seeking to carry over modified versions of the colonial
system of land tenure.9 The extensive prerogatives over land of the colonial state, in this region
of former extractive colonies, were appealing to new elites with developmental and or selfish
objectives. The continued use of a domaine national from the colonial period meant that the state
would be the ultimate owner of the vast majority of lands, with prerogatives over allocation.10
More specifically, the use of a “leasehold” system, in which an occupant must satisfy
requirements of economic development or mise en valeur in order to receive a revocable and
conditional title to land, persisted in many former French colonies and the Democratic Republic
In 2007, Boone wrote “Over 80 percent of all arable land in sub-Saharan Africa is currently held under some form
of ‘customary’ or non-statutory tenure.”
Catherine Boone, “Property and Constitutional Order: Land Tenure Reform and the Future of the African State,”
African Affairs 106, no. 425 (2007): 11.
9
John Bruce et al., Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa 1996, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin –
Madison, 1998: 8.
10
Sara Berry, “Struggles Over Land and Authority in Africa,” African Studies Review 60, no. 3 (2017), 108.
8
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of Congo (DRC), which was a Belgian colony. Such mise en valeur requirements were, in
theory, a means to solidify the state’s decision-making power over land; local committees or
administrators sent by the center would assess the productivity of landholders and reallocate land
in cases where standards of use were unmet. Guinea, DRC, Republic of Congo, Benin, Senegal,
Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, to name a few examples, saw “nationalization, partial nationalization,
or some variation on this theme”11 in their first decades of independence.
Despite statist laws, traditional authorities continued to play a significant role in land
allocation decisions in these nations and throughout West Africa, either as a result of political
strategies for incorporating the periphery (which meant applying statist laws according to the
interests of coopted local authorities) or state weakness. Thus, in 1996 Bruce wrote that, “in all
West African Countries, whether officially recognized or not, community-based [neo-customary,
in the terms of this study] tenure systems predominantly dictate who has access to land and
natural resources.”12 Such a state of affairs indicates the relevant distinction between de jure and
de facto land tenure systems as well as a certain degree of “legal pluralism,” often decried by
legalistic development experts as being inimical to the formation of stable land markets and rural
modernization.
Exceptions to the general trend of statist land tenure laws in West Africa are Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, and Guinea Bissau, countries that were not part of French West
Africa and where neo-customary land tenure regimes were enshrined in law on at least a regional
level.13 In these countries, the state expressly acknowledged the authority of chiefs in limited
areas to allocate land and resolve conflicts.
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Shifting our geographic focus, land tenure laws in the former colonies of East and
southern Africa, many with a history of settler colonization, differ from those of West Africa in
that they provide for privatization or full individual ownership of land. Consequently, higher
percentages of land are privately owned than in West African states.14 Nevertheless, statist land
laws are prevalent as well; in reaction to the presence of white settlers, “redistributive land
reform came hard on the heels of independence. In Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola, where
most land had been in the name of the state under the colonial concession regime, the new
governments retained state ownership and opted for socialist reform models, seeking to replace
household farming with village collectives or state farms.”15 Similarly, although not directly after
independence, “in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Namibia, land reform has meant the subdivision and
reassignment of what were either freehold or long-term leasehold white farms into smaller
holdings for resettlement by Africans, usually retained in state ownership and allocated to the
new holders on permits or leaseholds.”16 Even in this context of statist reforms and
nationalizations, it is important to keep in mind the coexistence of unofficial, de facto neocustomary land tenure regimes in this region as well.
These regional trends in post-independence land laws reveal the effect of colonial
experiences on the governance of land. In West Africa, the maintenance of colonial laws would
formally maintain a strong role for the state, yet, as will be shown in the case of the groundnut
basin of Senegal, such statist powers could actually often reinforce the authority of rural elites.
On the other hand, former British colonies in this region gave legal backing to neo-customary
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land tenure regimes, in line with the practices of colonial administrators. In East and southern
Africa, redistributive reforms went hand in hand with the direct rule of land while private
ownership of land is also relatively more common, both of which are tendencies stemming from
settler colony histories. Finally, while statist land tenure laws tended to be popular across the
continent in the decades after independence, the visions of such laws were rarely realized as neocustomary systems governed much more land than statist ones.
Shifting forward in time to the 1990s, international aid agencies began providing an
impetus for land law reforms, with a focus on securing private ownership rights. As African
governments agreed to structural adjustment programs to finance debts owed to international
creditors, donor agencies “had concluded that market reforms would not be effective unless
property rights were clearly defined and consistently enforced.”17 In conjunction with policies of
market liberalization and state retrenchment, many governments initiated land law reforms by
establishing or revitalizing national registries for land, attempting to provide a greater degree of
tenure security that was supposed to facilitate investment and economic growth.18
Simultaneously, donor funding for land law reforms and policy documents on the subject
increased greatly, making it all the more feasible and attractive for governments to undertake
reform processes.19 Between 1992 and 2006, land law reforms were undertaken in Tanzania,
Uganda, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Malawi, Mozambique, and Botswana,
to name a few cases.20
Just as statist land laws were mostly thwarted or obstructed by rural elites in the first
decades of independence, decentralization processes in the 1990s raised countervailing forces

Berry, “Struggles Over Land and Authority in Africa,” 106.
Ibid., 110.
19
Ambreena Manji, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2006), 56-57.
20
Boone, “Property and Constitutional Order,” 569.
17
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that worked against donors’ top-down efforts at formalization of tenure. 21 As struggling
governments sought to address challenges of legitimacy and to improve governance through
decentralization strategies,22 more and more prerogatives over land were shifted towards
traditional rural leaders. These processes diverted attention away from formalization of tenure
laws, as rural authorities were further empowered to uphold the traditional land relations that are
in many areas the foundation of their authority. For example, decentralization reforms in
Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire “bolster[ed] historical and communal rights that
circumscribe market forces.”23 Decentralization’s effects call to mind that land laws must be
considered within the social context in which they are implemented and have rarely led to new
land tenure regimes in a straightforward manner.
Today, many countries continue to recalibrate their land tenure systems through national
dialogues and further elaboration of new laws, as pressures on land mount from population
growth, urbanization, and global warming and liberalizations clear the way for large-scale land
grabs. With the World Bank pressing for privatization reforms, other actor have raised their
voices in national reform discussions to advocate for the securitization of user rights, which
would give small farmers security over the land they use, or for greater communal rights over
land, allowing communities to manage land for themselves.24
A Preliminary Case: Direct Rule of Land in Tanzania
Having laid out the broader historical trends in land governance across Africa, the study
will now begin constructing the argument regarding the political effects produced by statist land

Boone, “Property and Constitutional Order,” 574.
Tyler Dickovick and James Wunsch, eds., Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 5.
23
Boone, “Property and Constitutional Order,” 574.
24
Ibid., 571-576.
21
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tenure regimes. This subsection provides an in-depth summary of Boone’s Tanzania case study
in which she argues that the political identities and contestation strategies of rural populations are
shaped by the country’s statist land tenure regime. With respect to political identities, the
subsection outlines the argument that direct rule of land in Tanzania has contributed to the
emergence in rural areas of a nationalist political identity based on Tanzanian heritage and the
diminution of narrower ethnic political identities. It shows that, in seeking to appeal to state land
bureaucrats in moments of conflict, peasants adopt discourses of the state, which are based on
nationalist ideologies. It also examines the scaled-up institutions and strategies which peasants
use to assert or challenge claims to land, such as regional protest and elections. By outlining
Boone’s case, I aim to clarify the hypothesis’ predictions about how direct rule influences rural
forms of political contestation and the identities that motivate it. What Boone does not cover,
however, are the social dynamics that shape peasant politics, which I analyze in the main
chapters.
Boone’s case study provides empirical data on the forms of political action and identity
that arise under Tanzania’s statist tenure regime. She conducted fieldwork in the neighboring
Babati, Hanang, and Mbulu districts, located in north-central Tanzania, regions where land
scarcity is high and conflicts over it are prevalent. The research covers six instances of land
conflict, the first of which occurred in the Kiru Valley of Babati District. In the 1990s, following
the failure of agricultural projects on land leased by the government to private corporations, large
tracts were vacated by the lessees. Many indigenous small-farmers began working the newly
unoccupied lands, without legal permission to do so. The government tacitly allowed the
squatters to remain on the land, simply ignoring them. Subsequent decisions by the government
to lease the land to private investors, many of which were Tanzanian citizens of Asian descent,

21

has stoked conflict in a territory where land is scarce and where peasant families are expanding.
The ensuing struggles over who should have the right to work the land reveals much about the
specific effect of direct rule on political contestation and identity.
The rhetoric of identity surrounding the conflict pits “‘indigenous Tanzanians’ against
‘outside investors’ (who are non-indigenous Tanzanian citizens [of Asian descent.])25 Animosity
towards the Asian minority in Tanzania is entrenched in the political culture “as socialist-era
nationalism… [denounced] Asian citizens who accumulated private capital as bloodsucking
exploiters of citizenship.”26 Relying on this notion of authentic Tanzanian identity, peasants use
it to legitimize their demands, which they express “through violence, protests, civil disobedience,
and the multiparty system.”27 What is striking in the political use of a unified Tanzanian identity
is that the peasants of the Kiru Valley are culturally and ethnically heterogeneous, many of them
coming from families that migrated to the region to work on the estates of colonists.
This broad, de-ethnicized political identity emerges as a product of the direct rule of land,
which generates this identity in two ways. First, the state’s land allocation decisions are not
based on historical ethnic claims. Since ethnicity has no force under Tanzania’s statist tenure
system, that form of identity is supplanted by a nationalistic one with greater numerical strength,
capable of giving coherence to peasants’ claims. In this way, direct rule of land creates an
incentive structure which is more conducive to the formation of broader identity coalitions that
are not necessarily limited by distinctions of ethnicity. Political action in land conflict that is
grounded in a nationalist identity therefore becomes tenable and viable.
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Second, direct rule requires that appeals be made to state bureaucrats and therefore in a
political language that resonates with that audience. As peasants seek to target state land
administrators, they appropriate the discourse and ideology of Tanzanian nationalism, in an
attempt to talk to and sway bureaucrats using their own terms. James Scott’s work on peasant
resistance brings to light the rhetorical appropriation of the discourse of the state by
smallholders.28 Whereas Scott analyzes this phenomenon in southeast Asia, Brockington
similarly points to “a tradition of rural peoples exploiting their rulers and their rulers’ rhetoric in
Tanzania.”29 The discourse and ideology of national identity is entrenched in Tanzanian state
tradition, making it a point of leverage that peasants exploit in the land conflict of the Kiru
valley.30 The legacy of Nyerere’s socialist nationalism gives a degree of salience to claims that
are couched in its language. Under direct rule, political communication and claims are articulated
in such a way as to appeal to the modernist outlook of the state.
With respect to contestation strategies, direct rule incentivizes peasants to raise land
conflicts to regional and national political arenas. The smallholders of the Kiru Valley asserted
their claims in the national court system, bringing the conflict out of the village level and
implicating higher levels of state authority.31 In the run up to elections in 2010, a candidate of the
Chadema party seized upon peasant grievances and campaigned on land issues. The peasants, in
turn, “all… voted for Chadema.”32 Finally, the peasants’ various protests and forms of civil
disobedience elicited a response from the government, which sent leading members of
parliament to investigate the conflict. Together, the use of these national institutions as well as
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the politically noisy mobilization of peasants in the valley indicate that land contestation scaled
up in the system of direct rule of land in Tanzania.
Testing the Hypothesis
To be sure, Tanzania is a special case of nation-building. The legacy of a high modernist
state and Nyerere’s socialism have left a considerable impact on the nation and the people.33
Direct rule of land is itself a product of Tanzanian nation-building, as are all statist land tenure
systems in that they are assertions of modern state power over traditional local power. Given the
expansive history of nation-building, it is possible that factors other than the statist tenure regime
contributed disproportionately to the nationalism and engagement with the state observed in
Boone’s study. To further test the causality of direct rule of land, chapter two analyzes the
political effects produced by the statist land tenure regime in two regions of Senegal in the
1980s, where nation-building has proceeded less aggressively than in Tanzania, 34 making it a
case with less potential for confounding variables. Chapter three tests the hypothesis with the
case of Côte d’Ivoire, where the state for decades promoted the internal colonization of the cocoa
and coffee forest regions, controlling the allocation of land and agricultural resources to this end.
Finally, chapter 4 analyzes the peasant rebellion during the late 1970s and 1980s in the Tigray
region of Ethiopia under the Derg’s communist regime, which undertook nationalization of land
and agricultural collectivization. These cases were selected based on the occurrence of concerted
rural movements, so as to study their scope and political identities, to deduce what produced
those outcomes, and thereby strengthen or refute the hypothesis. After reviewing the findings, I
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conclude by linking them to present-day trends in African domestic and international politics and
by outlining areas of future research.
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Chapter II: Peasant Politics and Land in Senegal, 1970s-1980s
Introduction
This chapter tests the hypothesis by examining the political identities and contestation
strategies of peasants in Senegal, which has instituted a statist land regime. After a general
overview of the context of land tenure in rural Senegal and the 1964 Loi sur le domaine national
(1964 LDN), the law which aimed to establish the statist land regime, I analyze the effects it
produced in two socially distinct regions, the groundnut basin of central Senegal and Lower
Casamance, in the southwestern corner of the country. The findings from this section indicate the
importance of social structure as a determining factor in the outcomes for peasant politics under
statist land tenure systems. I first argue that the interaction of the statist land tenure system and
the hierarchy of the groundnut basin actually produced a form of indirect rule, which in turn
precluded the formation of peasant political identities and mobilization for land claims. I then
show that the egalitarian social structure of Lower Casamance pushed the state to govern without
relying on elite intermediaries, creating a more direct channel between Dakar’s land
administrators and the peasantry in the region and giving the former greater capacity to act
autonomously than in the groundnut basin. I argue that direct rule incentivized the adoption of a
regional political identity and the emergence of a peasant-based secessionist movement. The
conclusion summarizes the arguments and relates the findings to the hypothesis.
The Legal and Economic Context of Land in Senegal
The French colonial state’s limited penetration into rural society as well as its reliance on
rural notables as administrative middlemen were phenomena of the Senegalese colonial period
that left many traditional social structures, including those relating to land governance, in place
and in many cases stronger than before the arrival of Europeans. After independence, the
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enduring influence of traditional authorities contrasted sharply with the modernist vision of
Léopold Senghor’s government, whose members were influenced by the French political culture
of republican national uniformity and centrally managed capitalism.1 The Senegalese state
sought early on to assert its authority over rural leaders by enacting the 1964 Loi sur le domaine
national (LDN), the most important formal law which governs land allocation and tenure.
Through the 1964 LDN, “the state formally appropriated all powers and prerogatives to
distribute land throughout the entire national territory.”2 For the terms of this study, Senegal
therefore has a solidly statist land tenure regime.3 The law classifies 95% of land as belonging to
the “national domain,” which is supposed to be administered in a decentralized manner by
elected bodies, known as Rural Councils.4 The Rural Councils consist of local representatives as
well as leaders of farming cooperatives and are supposed to govern the allocation of land and
resolve disputes for groups of thirty to fifty villages.5 Through the Rural Councils, the 1964 LDN
aimed to usurp the power of traditional leaders and to place it in the hands of municipalities,
falling under the developmentalist and modernizing reach of the party-state, at the time
controlled by the Parti socialiste.
The 1964 LDN ordered the Rural Councils to grant tenure security to those who were
working the land in a productive way at the time of adoption, provided that the tenant lived in the
community where the land was located.6 Land is not considered to be inalienable property under
the 1964 LDN; an individual simply receives the right to manage it from the Rural Councils and

Donal Cruise O’Brien, Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 129.
2
Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 73.
3
As will be shown below, whether a statist land tenure regime takes hold in a region depends on the social context.
4
The remaining 5% of land is apparently designated as private property, whose owners are not subject to oversight
by the rural councils.
5
Donal Cruise O’Brien, The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic
Brotherhood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 202.
6
Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 75.
1

27

this right can be revoked if the management is not deemed to be productive. In the terms of the
law, the land is “affected” to individuals, families, or corporations and their continued right to
use of the land is contingent on their productive exploitation of it. As land rights would be
granted to those who worked the land, traditional forms of land tenure in which a landholder
does not directly exploit the land, such as share cropping or seasonal leasing, would become
illegal. The intent to eradicate these forms of land tenure gave the law its developmentalist
thrust, as it sanctioned a modernized yet communitarian form of agriculture.7 In light of the
requirement of community membership for rights to land, the law sought to support the
wellbeing of local farmers and the economic development of whole communities, who would be
shielded from speculative land grabs of outsiders. The extent to which the modernist vision of
1964 LDN has been realized, however, varies significantly across regions with traditional leaders
in the groundnut basin, for example, capturing the Rural Councils to perpetuate feudal forms of
land tenure.
Turning to the economic context, Senegal is an agrarian, low-income country. In 2017,
60% of the population was engaged in the agricultural sector, producing 15% of GDP. 8 The
principal export crop is the groundnut, which is grown by 27% of all households and by 52% of
households in extreme poverty.9 To this day, the groundnut has continued its historical
dominance of agriculture but donor and state projects to diversify the rural economy have
targeted rice and fruit cultivation. Although the cases examined in this section date to the 70s and
80s, when state-builders were still in the process of constructing the post-independence political
and economic order, these current statistics underscore the importance of the land tenure system
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to Senegal’s developing economy. Today as in the past, the land tenure system affects
livelihoods and development objectives across the country. While land conflicts have escalated
in the 21st century, access to land has been an extremely contentious issue for decades, as
demonstrated by the case study of Lower Casamance in the late 1970s and 1980s.Throughout
Senegal’s independent history, urbanization, proliferation of foreign land-grabbing, and state-led
agro-industrial development initiatives have put increasing pressure on peasants.10 Recent years
have seen an increase in the amount of land held by foreign corporations and there is an ongoing
national debate over pro-peasant versus agro-industrial land tenure systems and the extent to
which the government should favor either of these approaches.11 Having outlined the economic
context and the legal contours of the land regime in Senegal, let us now look more closely at its
ramifications for the political identities and contentious activities of small farmers.
Peasant Politics and the Land Tenure Regime in the Groundnut Basin and Lower
Casamance
How has the formally statist, non-ethnic system of land allocation in Senegal shaped the
political identities and contestation strategies of peasants? One can observe both statist and
quasi-traditional forms of land tenure in Senegal, since regional variations in social structure
dramatically affect the actual extension of the statist land tenure system. Given regional
differences in the degree of contact between the state and rural people, regional outcomes for
political identities and contestation strategies, the two aspects of peasant politics with which I am
concerned, differ correspondingly. In the socially-hierarchical groundnut basin of central
Senegal, where the marabout notables used the statist land tenure laws to reinforce their
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authority, peasants are locked in feudal relationships that heavily discourage the formation of
political identities and contestation strategies. In egalitarian Lower Casamance, on the other
hand, contact between peasants and the state fostered scaled-up contention, in the form of a
regional secessionist movement, which pressured the state for changes in land allocation. Similar
effects on identity and contestation emerged in Lower Casamance and Tanzania, I argue, because
of direct rule of land. This section will parse out the regionally differing outcomes produced by
the land tenure regime in Senegal.
Marabout Capture of Statist Land Institutions in the Groundnut Basin
In the Wolof groundnut basin of central Senegal from 1964 to the early 1990s, day-to-day
land allocations and conflicts were de facto governed by Muslim holy men and leaders known as
marabouts, whose control of statist institutions allows them to perpetuate the feudal dependence
of their peasant-followers. As noted, decision-making power over land was invested in the Rural
Councils, which oversee land allocations for groupings of villages. Despite the universal scope
and statist character of the 1964 LDN, the marabout elites of the groundnut basin captured the
Rural Councils, using them to reinforce their dominance. Exploiting their political and electoral
clout as the leaders of a hierarchical society and their ties to the Socialist Party, rural elites
secured nominations to seats on the Rural Councils and thus solidified their land management
powers.12 They effectively coopted the statist 1964 LDN and continued to govern land
distribution and conflict, now with an aura of state authority. “As progressive and modernizing
as the 1964 Loi sur le domaine national may have sounded at first, in [the groundnut basin] of
Senegal its effects were deeply conservative,”13 with the decentralization of state land
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institutions entrenching the authority of local elites. Moreover, “the goal of popular participation
[in rural economic development] was not accomplished, since state resources became the object
of patrimonial and clientelist management by the rural councils, headed by local notables.”14 In
this way, the decentralization of state power into the hierarchical, feudal society of the groundnut
basin actually stymied the development of a modern and democratic political system in the
region.
Regarding the effects on political identity and contestation over land conflicts, the statist
Rural Councils produced outcomes that differ sharply from the broad-based and highly
contentious ones observed in Tanzania. Given that the Rural Councils cemented the existing
feudal relationship between peasants and marabout landlords in the groundnut basin, it is
reasonable to ask whether peasants there are able to conceive of a political identity and
contestation strategy in land conflict at all. Under the hierarchically enforced stasis of feudalism,
the opportunities and incentives favoring the creation of a peasant political identity or
contestation strategy are minimized by the relationship of dependence, through which access to
land is mediated. The dependence of the peasant on the landlord means his claim to land is
purely individual, not based on a civic or national identity.15 There is no public space for
articulating claims on the basis of belonging to a collectivity; land claims are resolved in private
between marabout and peasant. In the groundnut basin, this individual relationship is however
characterized and structured by shared adherence to Islam. As such, peasants should be
motivated to accentuate their pious commitment to the faith and their marabout leader, in order
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to establish loyalty to him and receive additional land allocations or a favorable decision when a
conflict arises with another peasant. Nevertheless, the relational and personal nature of claims to
land in a feudal system precludes the formation of a political identity; there is no incentive to
identify with a collectivity to assert a land claim since they are personal affairs between the
marabout and peasant.
Contestation is similarly limited in this relationship. As isolated dependents of a
marabout, peasants lack the unifying power of a political identity that could give birth to a
collective movement to secure better land allocations. Moreover, the social hierarchy is also
justified and perpetuated by religious sanction; Marabouts “made groundnut cultivation a
religious duty for the peasants of central Senegal.”16 Any attempt to criticize or revolt against the
socioeconomic order surely jeopardizes the commitment of a peasant to the faith in the eyes of
the marabout and the religious community. Since the relationship between peasant-disciples and
the marabout is underwritten by piety, the former run the terrible risk of eviction from the land if
they demonstrate unfaithful behavior by challenging the established order.
Finally, we may deduce a basic understanding of the political weakness of the groundnut
basin peasantry, and by implication the absence of unified political identities and contestation
strategies, by examining the alliance that developed between the Socialist Party and the marabout
elite, which solidified political order in the region. Since the state was able to rely on indirect
rule in this region, what does that say about the political activity of the peasantry there? Under
the feudal system, peasants were electoral bargaining chips of the marabouts. Beck emphasizes
the marabouts’ control over the political action of the peasantry, noting that they “have been
characterized as the grands électeurs who historically have utilized their religious authority and
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the hierarchical structure of the brotherhoods to mobilize their disciples into large voting
blocs.”17 Knowing that electoral success could be guaranteed by the support of the marabouts,
with their utter control over the peasantry, “Senghor’s government used all means at its disposal
to institutionalize the conservative coalition of notables upon which it rested.”18 The postindependence government thus secured its reign by accepting the rural elite’s control over
institutions such as the Rural Councils.19 Given the political subjugation and electoral
manipulability of peasants in this feudal system, indirect rule was a politically expedient and
necessary tactic for Senegalese central leaders. That the peasants of the groundnut basin were so
easily controlled by their marabout leaders confirms their political disempowerment, and for the
purposes of my argument, a corresponding weakness in political identity and autonomous
contestation.
Ultimately, Senegal’s statist land tenure regime, which “was explicitly designed to end
exploitation of peasants by [marabout landowners] and others”20 was subsumed and transformed
into an institutional buttress for the social hierarchy in the groundnut basin. Whereas the 1964
LDN was formally a developmentalist and modernizing law, its application in practice
entrenched the traditional authorities of the groundnut basin. Consequently, its effects on the
political identity and contestation strategies of peasants, far from initiating an animation rurale
and stirring peasant consciousness, were simply to perpetuate the relationship of dependence,
opening no channels for collective action. Claims to land remained localized and individualized,
an affair between the marabout and the disciple in this context of order and piety. Religious
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sanctioning of the social order and the importance of pious subjugation to the marabout strongly
disincentivized the creation of political identities and strategies for contesting land claims. Cruise
O’Brien highlights the collective disempowerment of the peasantry of the groundnut basin,
noting that “the mass of peasant producers indeed have few economic or political resources, with
established rural leaders already partially committed to the state apparatus. They do nonetheless
have the means of an effective passive resistance…. Such a choice [however] certainly offers no
long-run solution to the dire material problems of the Senegalese peasantry.”21
The history of the land tenure regime in the groundnut basin of Senegal points to the
importance of social context and power differentials between the state and local authorities in
determining the extent to which a statist regime comes into contact with rural peoples. In
particular, rural social hierarchies can pose insurmountable obstacles to the modernizing visions
of central states. Rural social structure is therefore an important variable in determining the
political outcomes produced under statist land regimes. The next section clarifies our
understanding of social structure as a variable by analyzing the political effects produced by
Senegal’s land tenure regime in Lower Casamance, home to the egalitarian Diola society. This
non-hierarchical society makes Lower Casamance an important test case for social structure as
an intermediate determinant of the political effects produced by statist land tenure regimes. The
outcomes it produced are more in line with those observed in Tanzania, as rural peoples
mobilized collectively to challenge the state’s management of land. The form of political identity
that tied this movement together differed slightly from that of Tanzanian peasants; the peasants
of Lower Casamance adopted a regional identity, not a nationally encompassing one as in
Tanzania, although both were unconcerned with ethnicity.
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Statist Land Intervention and Regional Backlash in Lower Casamance
Senegal’s Casamance region is located south of the Gambia. A result of the perverse
national boundaries created during colonial rule, Casamance is geographically separated from the
rest of Senegal by the territorial strip of the Gambia. Moving from east to west, the region is
divided into Upper, Middle, and Lower Casamance. Occupying the southwestern corner of
Senegal, Lower Casamance is a lush, non-Sahelian region with fertile soils.22 In the colonial
period, peasants cultivated rice and fruit in addition to groundnuts there, thanks to adequate
rainfall. In the 1960s, these favorable agricultural conditions supported a population of
prosperous peasants who “lived in better houses and ate better than farmers anywhere else in
Senegal…. There were districts around Bignona, just south of the Casamance River, with some
of the highest rural population densities in all of West Afirca.”23
The region is home to the Diola people, whose societies are characterized by egalitarian
cohesiveness and a culture of horizontal solidarity.24 Diola society has “no castes, no monarchies
or aristocracies, and no hierarchical or bureaucratic state structures.”25 As in the groundnut basin,
religious life in Lower Casamance is implicated in the organization of society, but with an effect
opposite to that of maraboutic Islam. Pélissier notes that Diola religious tradition sustains social
equality and cohesion by emphasizing “honor, respect for the wellbeing of others, the duty of
solidarity, and pride in the family and the group.”26 In the areas where Islam has taken hold in
Lower Casamance, it has done so “less uniformly and less hegemonically than in the North, and
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not in the form of the centralized brotherhoods that so dominate central Senegal.”27 Moreover,
mutual-aid organizations uphold the principals of social equality and cooperation in daily life,
providing shared farm labor and additional assistance during difficult seasons for their
members.28 Pélissier asserts that these groups “plainly manifest the Diola sense of solidarity.”29
Before analyzing the process by which direct rule pushed Diola peasants, and those belonging to
other ethnic groups of Lower Casamance, to collectively contest the state’s land management, I
will clarify why and how the presence of an egalitarian society brought about a more aggressive
application of statist land tenure there than in the hierarchical groundnut basin.
The egalitarian society of Lower Casamance required a different strategy of rule than the
one employed in the groundnut basin. The region’s horizontal social structure constrained the
ways in which the central state could control and govern, since Diola society “lacked the social
hierarchies that can provide ready-made infrastructure for indirect rule.”30 That is, the absence of
distinct leaders, who could function as intermediaries to guarantee the electoral support of the
peasantry as well as its submission to taxation, meant that the central state had to truly pursue
direct rule in Lower Casamance.
Instead of passively allowing dependable local elites to capture the Rural Councils as in
the groundnut basin, Dakar made its agents oversee and intervene in local land decisions, acting
as the authority over land starting in 1979, when a groundnut price crisis and prolonged drought
necessitated a transformation of the agricultural sector. For example, although “land allocation
was the main responsibility of the new elected [Rural Councils]…. sous-préfets [unelected
administrators chosen by the state] usually handled land questions in more-or-less unilateral
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fashion.”31 By way of the sous-préfets, the state asserted itself directly into local land affairs,
creating a new dimension to its relationship with the peasantry as well as new points of contact
to which collective action could be directed. What is more, this project of direct rule picked up
considerable strength in the 1980s when national financial interests and aid agencies began
pressuring the state to diversify the economy beyond the struggling groundnut sector.32 The state
set out to develop and modernize agriculture in Lower Casamance, further enhancing the
administrative strength and prerogatives of its agents and, crucially, facilitating access to land for
outsiders. To this end, it turned a blind eye to violations of the 1964 LDN which prohibits the
allocation of land to individuals who do not live in the community. Centrally led development
projects and extensive land allocations to wealthy non-local investors ensued:
Around Ziguinchor and Cap Skirring, the Rural Councils were instruments by which
Casamançais from other localities, functionaries native to other regions of Senegal,
marabouts from the groundnut basin and their peasant followers, Dakarois, and even
French firms acquired land for groundnut production, orchards, touristic encampments,
or fishing rights. These same actors lined up to get a piece of the action in new irrigation
and land reclamation projects, many of them financed in part by international lenders
such as the World Bank.33
These highly disruptive interventions incited the fury of the Diola, who were dismayed to see
their lands falling into the hands of outsiders to the detriment of the local population, with the
full-fledged support of Dakar. Pointing to the economic and cultural importance of land, Darbon
notes that “the state and notably its public development agencies continually undermined the
Diola’s precious connection to the Earth.”34 The sense of “an invasion and systematic land
expropriation by nordistes”35 galvanized the Diola who initiated broad-based collective action

31

Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 125.
Beck, “‘Patrimonial Democrats’ in a Culturally Plural Society,” 255.
33
Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 134.
34
Dominique Darbon, “Le culturalisme bas-casamançais,” Politique africaine 14 (1984) : 128.
35
Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 134.
32

37

against the state and the status quo of land allocation. A group known as the Mouvement des
Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) organized the peasants’ collective action and
asserted secessionist claims through protests as well as destruction of state property and violence
against officials. Throughout these mobilizations, the peasants adopted a regional political
identity, emphasizing the unity of Casamance against a conspiracy of exploitative interests
supported by Dakar. The analysis of these political effects demonstrates that the direct rule of
land conditioned peasants’ adoption of a regional political identity and their mobilization in
Lower Casamance. Before treating the ways in which direct rule influenced the forms of
contention, let us clarify the processes leading to mobilization.
Explaining Mobilization in Lower Casamance
Lower Casamance’s political and economic marginalization within the “Islamo-Wolof”36
state primed the region for contentious activity. The political status quo ruptured as the state
intensified its pro-nothern land allocations and development projects in the late 70s and early
80s, following the crash of groundnut prices and sustained droughts. This burst of heightened
state intervention, encouraged by international creditors, marked the social change episode that
triggered the MFDC’s mobilization. Seeing more and more outsiders gaining access to land and
the benefits of development schemes, the Casamançais saw the central state as depriving them of
resources and engaged in threat attribution, this instance being more direct and proximal than
what was felt over the previous decades of generalized political-economic exclusion.37
Simultaneously, a new opportunity emerged for a concerted challenge to Dakar’s increasingly
unfair clientelism. In November of 1981, a group of Diola officials and notables met in secret at
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the regional airport to form the MFDC.38 Having organized a core group of motivated actors, the
movements’ initial members were able to expand their following by tapping into Diola mutualaid groups and the generally robust networks of cooperation and solidarity; this social
appropriation allowed the movement to generate considerable strength, spreading into rural
forest communities.39 From these mobilizing sites, the MFDC coordinated protests and guerrilla
tactics, in what amounted to a full-fledged insurgency against the Senegalese state.
Direct Rule of Land and Political Effects in Lower Casamance
Direct rule operated in two ways to produce the political identity and mobilization with
which we are concerned; it first created the regional frustration that motivated peasants’
collective action across Lower Casamance and then implicated the central state as the authority
behind the population’s marginalization and, therefore, the state became the target to which
collective action was to be directed. As direct rule of land linked the central state’s land
decisions and actions to the shared regional experience of hardship, it provided the impetuses for
the articulation of a regional political identity and the broad-based secessionist movement
throughout Lower Casamance. By analyzing the political incentives created by the statist
administration of land, I aim to illuminate the processes by which the state’s management of land
in Lower Casamance fomented peasant identity formation and collective action at the regional
level.
Turning first to political identity, the one adopted by peasants connected to the
secessionist movement was regional in nature and inclusive of ethnic diversity, even though the
movement was dominated by the Diola people. Nevertheless, Beck writes that Casamance
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separatists “do not… rely on a rhetoric of ethnic mobilization, but rather regional identity in
response to malign neglect by state institutions which the separatists claim are dominated by
northerners, and to what the separatists describe as the ‘invasion’ of the Casamance by
‘northerners.’”40 Direct rule gave rise to this regional political identity by uniformly subjecting
the peasantry of Lower Casamance to expropriation and economic marginalization, regardless of
ethnicity. In this way, direct rule of land created a shared grievance, around which peasants
unified themselves and on which they based their political identity. By transcending ethnicity
and creating a region-wide experience of economic and political exclusion, direct rule groups the
peasants of Lower Casamance together, linking them through the common grievance of reduced
access to land.
In light of the structural dominance of northern interests over state land decisions, direct
rule further accentuated regional divisions, with the Casamançais seeing themselves under the
yoke of Dakar and its Wolof partners.41 A Casamance regional political identity therefore
became more salient as it was opposed to and contrasted against unjust domination by the
northerners. In the context of Lower Casamance and its relation to the rest of Senegal, direct rule
made regional identity a relevant category for peasants to use in articulating and unifying their
claims. Just as direct rule of land appeared to foster a nationalist political identity in Tanzania,
the salience of regional identity in Lower Casamance supports the hypothesis’ predictions that
direct rule of land tends to generate political identities that extend beyond ethnicity and the scope
of the village.
This regional identity rhetorically unified the secessionist movement of Casamance. The
secessionists engaged in all forms of protest, ranging from destruction of infrastructure to public
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demonstrations.42 The first actions began in 1982, when “the MFDC organized a demonstration
in which over a thousand Casamançais of various ethnic groups, though primarily Joola,
marched through the streets of Ziguinchor, taking down the Senegalese flags from government
buildings and replacing it with a white sheet as a statement of Casamance independence.”43
Continuing the argument, the collective actions of the secessionist movement were
generated by direct rule of land. To be sure, there is no shortage of analysts who “directly
attribute the emergence of [the] guerrilla secessionist movement in Lower Casamance in 1982 to
the application of Senegal’s administrative and land reforms in 1979.”44 In what way did direct
rule of land lead peasant political action to take on the form of a social movement? The answer
lies in the fact that direct rule shifted the scale at which peasant contestation became effective,
making the regional secessionist movement a politically viable strategy, capable of producing
desired outcomes. Direct rule of land made the state the target of land claims, which therefore
incentivized peasants to build a movement that was capable of pressuring the state for change. In
order to achieve the political goal of greater control over the allocation of land, the peasants of
Lower Casamance constructed a movement that could realistically pressure the state, as the
authority which currently controls that resource. Moreover, just as direct rule united the peasants
of Lower Casamance in a shared experience of dispossession of land, it similarly facilitated the
formation of the secessionist movement by creating ample potential supporters and recruits,
eager to challenge the state’s land management. In other words, direct rule of land created both a
logical basis for broad-based contestation and the political actors willing to contribute to that
contestation.
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Through the secessionist movement, the contestation of land management scaled up to a
national level, raising questions about the territorial integrity of the Senegalese state and its
authority over Lower Casamance. As a result of where direct rule located authority over land, the
peasant movement responded with actions that rose to the level of the central state, going beyond
village boundaries. The scaling up of the contestation produced an equivalent response from
Dakar; Beck writes that
President Diouf responded to the Casamance problem with [investments in]…. a number
of infrastructure projects: repairing roads as well as the bridge to Ziguinchor; building
schools; and initiating large development projects such as the Anambe-Kayan dam
funded by the Saudi government. The state also created a new commission on the
distribution of land in Ziguinchor that was generally considered to be more equitable in
its decisions.45
Simultaneously, Dakar deployed the military in order to eradicate secessionist guerillas and a
simmering struggle between the state’s forces and the MFDC continues to this day. In this way,
we see direct rule scaling up peasants’ contestation strategies to the national level in Lower
Casamance, as in Tanzania, in line with the hypothesis, and even eliciting national-level
responses.
Conclusion
The cases of the groundnut basin and Lower Casamance revealed firstly that social
structure was critically determinative of the effects that Senegal’s formally statist land tenure
regime produced for peasant politics. Political expediency and rural powerbases shaped the
application of the law. In the groundnut basin, the marabouts’ domination of social and political
life enabled that group to turn the law into a buttress to their existing authority, integrating it into
the modern state. Indirect rule based on feudal social arrangements emerged in the region. I
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argued that the rigidity and hierarchy of feudalism strongly disincentivized the formation of
peasant political identities and contestation strategies.
The absence of a social hierarchy in the societies of Lower Casamance forced the state to
adopt a more rigorously statist approach to land management there. The egalitarian Diola people
did not provide the social leaders who could be coopted as intermediaries of the state, as in the
groundnut basin. Conflict over land erupted as the state began to allocate land to outsiders,
displacing the local populations. The regional political identity and the secessionist movement
which it supported were products of the direct rule of land in Lower Casamance. Firstly, the
state’s land allocations affected peasants across the region, giving them a shared grievance
around which they articulated a regional political identity. Secondly, the fact of the state’s
control over land made it the relevant target of land claims. Peasants in the region had an
incentive to mobilize on a scale that would exert meaningful and threatening pressure on the
state. Ultimately, the frictional relations between the state’s land administration and the Diola
society, coupled with conditions for mobilization, pushed the region’s peasants to form the
multi-ethnic, secessionist movement in Lower Casamance.
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Chapter III: The Forest Frontier and Rural Politics in Côte d’Ivoire, 19901999
Introduction
Throughout Côte d’Ivoire’s colonial and independent history, agriculture has occupied a
place of central importance in politics. From independence in 1960 to democratization in 1990,
the regime of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny built its political-economic order around a
system of export agriculture, bargaining with clients and allocating state resources as needed.
This chapter will first survey the system of export-led agricultural development that dominated
the Ivorian economy from independence to the death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993.
To set up the argumentative section, I address the state’s patterned interventions in customary
land tenure systems and the tensions that emerged in rural areas as a result of this covert form of
direct rule. In comparison with the more intensely statist systems of rural economic management
studied in the Tanzania and Lower Casamance sections, the Ivorian system is referred to as being
“semi-statist,”1 in that the state exercised tremendous influence over the rural economy without
ever abolishing local tenure systems; through consistent intercessions from administrators, the
state profoundly shaped broad trends in land allocation and agriculture, while traditional leaders
continued to oversee quotidian affairs in these domains. The discussion of what scholars have
called the Houphouëtist system will establish the historical context for the mutations in rural
politics that occurred in the 1990s when the economic status quo was contested following
Houphouët-Boigny’s death and the dissolution of his political coalition. After analyzing the
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emergence of contestation, I will show how the pattern of state intervention in agriculture and
land management produced the mutations, which were the electoral nationalization of the land
question and the concomitant emergence of the concept of ivoirité, a political identity that
conditioned full Ivorian citizenship on autochthony and “authentic” belonging to the nation-state.
Both of these outcomes, I argue, support the hypothesis’ predictions regarding the upscaling and
broadening of peasant contention and identities, respectively.
The Ivorian Miracle: Export Agriculture, Immigration, and Patronage
A doctor and plantation farmer, Félix Houphouët-Boigny was elected president of Côte
d’Ivoire in 1960, the year of its formal independence from France. Having risen to prominence
for his successful leadership of cocoa and coffee planters in the late colonial period, he governed
a one-party state with a charismatic, populist persona and was known fondly throughout most of
his 33 years of rule as the Président Paysan (Peasant President) and Le Vieux (The Old One). His
country stood out amongst the newly independent African states for its exceptional export-led
growth, embrace of world capitalism, and relatively wealthy smallholder population in the 60s
and 70s. GDP growth averaged 8% per year between 1961 and 1975, 2 while producers were paid
a stable and internationally competitive price for their crops that increased with inflation.3 The
subject of much scholarly debate, the so-called Ivorian Miracle was based on the extensive
cultivation of cocoa and coffee throughout the countryside and the international boom in prices
for these goods, spurred by demand from increasingly wealthy consumers in Europe and North
America. During the colonial period, vast expanses of frontier forest land enabled a “cash crop
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revolution,” which made Côte d’Ivoire the wealthiest colony of French West Africa.4 Influxes of
migrant smallholders, often from poorer regions of the French West African empire, to the
sparsely populated forest regions powered the expansion of the cash crop frontier and became a
fixture of the Ivorian political-economy.
Spurred by colonial precedent, steady immigration became an essential feature of Ivorian
rural development for a number of reasons. In addition to political-economic forces discussed
below, the intrinsic characteristics of cocoa production factored into the trend. Cocoa is most
profitable when it is cultivated in fresh soils, which in turn drives outward expansion and the
emergence of “pioneer fronts,” cleared by migrant farmers. Clarence-Smith and Ruf explain the
dynamics of cocoa pioneer fronts and are worth quoting at length:
In the 1980s… comparative research demonstrated the dependence of cocoa cultivators
on the exploitation of a ‘differential forest rent,’ in the Ricardian sense of the term. A
forest rent exists because it is rarely economically viable to replace decrepit cocoa trees
by new ones in the same land, or to plant cocoa in land used previously for other crops,
as long as forest is available. Planters clearing poorly regenerated secondary forest and
former coffee groves to grow cocoa in eastern Madagascar found that they could not
compete on the world market. Producers clearing primary forest, in contrast, benefited
from the fertility of virgin soils and low concentrations of weeds, pests and diseases….
Given the existence of this forest rent, cocoa cultivation has been marked by the sporadic
emergence of new ‘pioneer fronts,’ defined as large groups of immigrants rapidly
clearing tropical forest to plant cocoa.5
In light of cocoa’s logic of profitability, Houphouët-Boigny’s government facilitated a steady
flow of migrants to frontier regions, coercing local authorities to welcome them and to give them
access to land.6 With the post-war commodity price boom in full swing, the independent
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government reaped considerable benefits from this model of agricultural development based on
pioneering small farmer immigration
Initiated under encouraging geographic, ecological, and market conditions, export-led
development was sustained by patronage politics: “the dominance of Houphouët-Boigny’s Parti
Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) rested on an elaborate system of patronage financed by
agricultural export earnings.”7 The government was able to derive the bulk of its revenue
through its marketing board, which retained a portion of the price it received for the crops on the
international market. When not being stored in the price stabilization fund or devoted to
development projects, export taxes were used to satisfy political clients and to shore up the
PDCI’s hold on power.8 The rents and benefits of export agriculture “constituted a powerful
instrument for paternalist regulation of the sociopolitical space, assuring a certain stability within
the political system.”9
The survival of Houphouët-Boigny’s regime was thus dependent on the good functioning
and expansion of export agriculture. Constant immigration, to drive the sector, was all the more
necessary. Seeking to maximize export earnings and driven by the constraints of cocoa
profitability, Houphouët-Boigny used an open-door immigration policy to bring farmers from
Burkina Faso, Mali, and other poorer countries to the southern and western forest lands.10
Farmers from the northern regions were encouraged to become cocoa pioneers as well. As their
numbers increased, the migrant laborers at the forefront of Ivorian agriculture became a
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significant and valuable constituency, in many southwestern districts comprising at least 20%
and up to 25% of the population.11
The obedience of the growing number of smallholders became a necessity for the PDCI,
hoping to maintain a stable and unobstructed flow of exports to the world market. By appealing
to the rural producers from which it derived its wealth and power, giving special attention to the
migrant population, the PDCI secured an economic and political order in the countryside.
Chauveau describes the social contract that emerged, writing, “In return for guarantees in respect
of prices, outlets, farm inputs and a rising standard of living, rural people were expected to show
political submission and recognize the monopoly of the state and its agents over management of
the cash crop sector.”12 The coalition between rural peoples and the PDCI underpinned what
Chauveau terms a “peasant state,” in which the party-state ensured its survival by negotiated
access to the wealth produced by small farmers.
The negotiations and interventions that facilitated this relationship are indicative of the
state’s influence over the rural economy and peasant livelihoods and, therefore, of great
importance to the argument here. A system of inconspicuous direct rule emerged with the
strategies that the state used to maintain its export-dependent political-economic order. While it
continued to recognize the authority of customary leaders over day-to-day land decisions, the
PDCI directed its agents to facilitate the expansion of the cash crop frontier. To this end, a semistatist system took shape as:
non-Ivorian and Ivorian colonists [of the frontier] enjoyed protection in gaining access
to land: pressures were applied to the local village authorities and communities to get
them to welcome migrant farmers…. Disputes were settled in favor of migrants who were
developing the land; locals were forbidden to make foreigners pay rent; and the
infiltration of protected forests was tolerated. In the North, if crops were damaged by
large herds practicing transhumance, government agents sided with the herd owners. In
11
12

Akindès, Les racines de la crise, 10.
Chauveau, “Question foncière,” 104.

48

the Western forest region, landed estates were allocated to members of the ruling elite,
who often originated from the East or Centre of the country.13
The state, therefore, worked on the behalf of its pioneer smallholder clients and others who were
seen as contributing to export agriculture throughout the 60s and 70s. This pattern of state
intercession in rural society constitutes the peasant-state relationship that, as hypothesized,
should cause smallholder contestation strategies and political identities to respectively scale
upwards and to become more inclusive. The Ivorian case is, however, unique in that customary
authorities continued to oversee day-to-day aspects of rural social and economic life.14 The
enduring authority of traditional leaders, whose governance tended to favor members of the
ethnic group and blood-based claims to land, sustained the salience of ethnicity in rural society.
As we will see, the interaction of an ethnically-conscious rural population with state support for
outsiders produced an electoral mobilization for xenophobic, nationalist politicians appealing to
disaffected rural autochthones. This mobilization occurred following a decade of mounting
tensions in rural areas, produced by intractable problems within the political-economic order, and
the political vacuum that appeared in the wake of Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, events to
which we now turn.
The End of Houphouëtism and the Reconfiguration of the Ivorian Polity
A confluence of events undermined the stability of Houphouët-Boigny’s regime and its
rural and urban coalitions throughout the 1980s.15 First, undeveloped forest land became scarce,
while the populations seeking to farm it continued to rise. Tensions between indigenous and
migrant farmers rose as land became less accessible. While minor disputes between the two
groups were commonplace in the preceding decades, they became more virulent and numerous
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as supplies of unworked land dwindled.16 Where the state had previously been able to negotiate
and coerce the settlement of land disputes, it now faced disgruntled farmers without the
convenience of a forest frontier. Moreover, commodity prices slumped in the 1980s, causing
state revenues, read as patronage resources, to dry up. As a result, the PDCI’s ability to appease
elites and gain their loyalty weakened somewhat. Worse yet, these difficulties were compounded
by the fact that the government found itself unable to pay off its loan debt. Bitten by the
dependence for which it had opted, Côte d’Ivoire was ironically constrained by the system that
had made it the success story of African independence and export-led development within the
world economy.
Seeking reprieve from its financial distress, Houphouët-Boigny’s regime turned to the
international lending agencies and became one of the first African governments to implement a
structural adjustment package in exchange for debt relief. Liberalization and retrenchment, while
intended to raise producer prices and protect against urban-bias, exacerbated other conditions for
small farmers, who had benefitted from the marketing board, price stabilization, and technical
assistance, all of which were now reduced or eliminated. Rural areas experienced further duress
as urban-dwellers, formally employed in administration and parastatals, lost their jobs and
returned to their villages of origin in search of land and farm work. “Finding that their elders had
distributed most of their land to strangers, leaving little for their sons to cultivate or live on,
urban returnees vented their frustration – berating their elders for depriving them of their
patrimony, while joining them in resentment against the immigrants whom they regarded as
exploiters.”17
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As rural and urban areas wrestled with unemployment and a faltering economy, Ivorians
began calling for democratization and the end of one-party rule. Combined with demands to the
same end from international donors, Houphouët-Boigny ushered in multi-party competition and
announced a presidential election in 1990.18 He won the election and remained in office, though
unprecedented fissures in the Ivorian polity had emerged and would go unaddressed in the final
years of Houphouëtism. In the forest regions, schisms between indigenous and immigrant
populations came to the fore as land disputes intensified and began to turn on communal
belonging and inherited, traditional rights. More than ever, the categories of insider and outsider
became apparent. What is more, state policies of favoring migrants increasingly came under
scrutiny and drew the ire of indigenous groups, as the basis for their dispossession.
Perceptions of differential treatment and state favoritism further activated insider and
outsider identities. Hitherto unchallenged, the ethnic hierarchy of the state became a point of
salience as well.19 Dominated by the Baoulé, Houphouët-Boigny’s ethnic group, the
government’s cooperation with immigrants at the expense of the forest populations heightened
unease and tension. Members of the fragmented and acephalous societies of the forest regions,
frustrated by their land deprivation, came to see the government as a cabal of Baoulé and nonindigenous interests. Lines of opposition were being drawn, with the “true” Ivorians, whose
ancestors had inhabited the forest for generations, on one side and the corrupt government and its
foreign clients on the other. These were the first signs of the mutations in rural political identities
that would culminate in the adoption of ivoirité (Ivorianness) and the fierce debates over its
meaning and scope.
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Explaining Opposition Mobilization and Electoral Changes
As tensions spread, questions of the state’s role in agriculture and of who should have
access to land, employment, and citizenship attained new importance in Ivorian politics. Before
these questions could come up for debate, the old Houphouëtist consensus had to be challenged.
Why did the previously stable political scene become contested and what mobilized voters in
opposition to the PDCI? Channeled for the most part through the new opposition parties, the
Ivorian polity between 1993 and 1999 was recalibrated by processes of contained or institutional
and transgressive contention,20 though forms of the latter became more commonplace as
struggles wore on in the decade. The Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) and the Rassemblement des
Républicains (RDR) seized on the political opportunities produced by sweeping social change
processes, begun with the socio-economic crises and democratization and then amplified with
the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993.21 Having bolstered the PDCI’s power with his
charismatic leadership, Houphouët-Boigny’s death created additional space for contention. Henri
Konan Bédié, a member of the PDCI and leader of the National Assembly, assumed the
presidency in accordance with constitutional law, but the country’s first leadership change
nonetheless stimulated contentious activity, with then prime minister Alassane Dramane
Ouattara attempting a power grab. At the constituent level, as voters suffered unemployment and
or came to resent outsiders, they increasingly attributed a threat to the PDCI’s status quo and
became motivated to affiliate with opposition parties catering to their concerns. Thus, the PDCI
faced institutional contention with the opposition’s mobilization of new supporters. Later on in

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 7: “Contained contention refers to those cases of
contention in which all parties are previously established actors employing well established means of claim
making…. Transgressive contention consists of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and
their objects… when at least some of the parties employ [unprecedented or forbidden forms of] collective action.”
21
Akindès, Racines de la crise, 22.
20

52

the decade, localized, yet widespread forms of transgressive contention emerged, such as
expulsion of foreigners, which, while not directly aimed at the PDCI, still eroded its authority. In
the southwestern region of Tabou, indigenous citizens took it upon themselves to expel
Burkinabe workers; a journalist for Le Monde wrote, “what happened in Tabou is only an
indication of what is happening throughout the country.”22 The spreading rural unrest was also
rooted in the social change of economic crisis and the attribution of a foreign threat, but it
interacted with the institutionalized, electoral contention and inflammatory anti-immigrant
rhetoric of leading politicians. Moreover, as the opposition parties grew in stature, uncertainty
and perceptions of the PDCI’s weakness mounted, stimulating transgressive contention in
defiance of the law.
The fracturing of the PDCI’s coalition and the rise of the opposition also point to the
effect of social structure on the mobilization of opposition support. Specifically, social structure
shaped the state’s regional presence and played into the opposition’s rise. Under one-party rule,
regions were incorporated into the PDCI’s order to different degrees, according to the presence
and leverage of regional brokers, as was the case in Senegal under the Parti socialiste. In the
southwestern forest regions, society was organized into “small, decentralized settlements of
farming households, where decisions were made by household heads or groups of elders, rather
than by chiefs.”23 The absence of a substantial social hierarchy in these regions, populated by the
Kru and southern Mandé ethnicities, meant that there were few regional intermediaries to
negotiate the unfolding of Houphouëtism on the forest frontier. These populations were
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consequently excluded from processes of internal party-state bargaining.24 The state therefore
acted with fewer constraints in the region, allowing it to more aggressively promote land
allocation for migrants, which ultimately contributed to the marginalization of the indigenous
populations. As predicted by the hypothesis, the fragmentation of the southwestern forest
societies permitted the state to intervene heavily in land allocation and to do so with fewer
restrictions than in regions controlled by powerful intermediaries. The social character of the
region led to both a more complete extension of state influence and the population’s exclusion
from the patronage system. With the advent of democratization, the disgruntled, non-hierarchical
populations of the forest frontier provided the electoral support for opposition parties, especially
the FPI, to challenge the PDCI’s order. In this way, the variable of social structure produced an
alienated constituency, frustrated with its structural domination, for the opposition to mobilize
and with which to contest the status quo of the rural economy.
With the opposition capitalizing on the social change processes and political
opportunities that emerged in the wake of Bédié’s assumption of power, “one witnesses
Houphouëtism on trial with a call for a reinvention of fundamental political comprises.”25 That
reinvention proceeded with the electoral competition amongst the PDCI, the FPI, and the RDR,
whose constituencies I describe below. In the campaigning, debates, and policies that came with
this electoral jockeying, questions of the state’s role in agriculture and of who should have access
to resources and rights were of central importance. That is, rural grievances and claims were
newly contested in national electoral politics. Having tracked the conditions leading to electoral
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contention, let us now examine the instances of scaled-up rural claims and political identities in
that arena and analyze their roots in the legacy of Houphouëtist intervention in rural affairs.
Ivoirité, the Land Law of 1998, and the State: The Upscaling of Rural Issues
With the disintegration of Houphouëtism, the three parties each sought to construct
electoral coalitions with direct appeals to rural constituencies. The FPI of Laurent Gbagbo
primarily represented the disaffected indigenous populations of the West and Southwest forest
frontier, which, for the reasons discussed earlier, saw themselves as excluded from the benefits
of the PDCI’s political-economic order. 26 The RDR of Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the
country’s current president, consisted of alienated PDCI cadres and a voting bloc in the majority
Muslim North of herders and some farmers that had migrated to the frontier. Over the decade’s
presidential and legislative contests, the opposition parties forced the PDCI, now led by Henri
Konan-Bédié who assumed the presidency with the passing of Houphouët-Boigny, to reevaluate
its own rural policies and rework its electoral base. The PDCI continued to control the Baoulé
grouping in the center of the country, though it needed to shore up its appeal to other
constituencies that were increasingly approached by the opposition. Influenced by the demands
of electoral competition, the contestation of rural economic and land grievances became a central
focus of national party politics, culminating in the passage of a new land code. Also of
importance to the hypothesis, parties mobilized voters using the political identity of ivoirité,
which combined both nationalist and ethnic rhetoric. I will describe these outcomes and then
demonstrate the way in which the legacy of state intervention in rural affairs caused them to play
out in national party politics and legislation.
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As indigenous populations linked regional marginalization to the Houphouëtist state’s
support for migrants, a nationalist xenophobia took hold across the countryside. To coopt these
sentiments and to discredit his main challenger in the 1995 presidential election who had
professional and diplomatic links to Burkina-Faso, Bédié deployed a new political identity, that
of ivoirité.27 While multiple definitions exist, ivoirité generally fused both national and ethnic
attachments, defining a true Ivorian citizen as someone who belonged to one of the country’s
native ethnicities. A university theorist associated with Bédié wrote of the concept, “the
individual who has ivoirité is a citizen of Côte d’Ivoire and is born of Ivorian parents belonging
to one of the autochthonous ethnicities of Côte d’Ivoire.”28 It politicized and nationalized
autochthony, conditioning citizenship and access to resources on being a “son of the soil.”
Reflecting the coalition building requirements of multi-party elections, ivoirité combined
nationalism and ethnicity in one political identity.
Bédié demonstrated his commitment to this new ideology with two legislative acts in
particular. First, he reversed the PDCI’s historical openness to migrants by barring them from
voting and running in future elections with the passing of a new electoral code in 1994.29 Over
the next four years he also worked with opposition parties to craft a new land law. The Land Act
of 1998 passed in the National Assembly and stipulated that only Ivorian nationals could own
land. Land claims and identity were now inseparable and the state henceforth would recognize
ownership strictly on the basis of citizenship, in a dramatic reversal of the legacy of proimmigrant intervention.30 Where previously the state had relied on a certain degree of legal
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ambiguity to ensure that immigrants were given access to land and the right to work it, the new
land law expressly barred them from ownership and mandated that they receive permission from
customary proprietors to obtain use rights.31 The new emphasis on customary permission for
non-citizen use rights empowered and appeased dispossessed autochthones, allowing them to
evict unwanted foreign users.
Like ivoirité, the land law was the product of the struggle to win rural constituents in a
multi-party system: “party bosses and politicians were generally tempted to embrace the
autochthonous claims of their electoral bases,”32 finally culminating in the new land tenure law.
In the years leading up to its passage, the debates and appeals regarding the state’s land tenure
system reflected the extent to which “the question of the distribution of increasingly scarce
resources (landed property, jobs, various forms of power and their attributes, etc.) became the
major issue in domestic politics.”33 It is in the electoral and legislative struggle over the land
question that rural claims were contested at the highest level of politics, transcending their local
origins.
Analysts have pointed to the distinct combination of rural frustration and political
identities that ivoirité and the Land Act of 1998 sought to valorize and coopt. Babo and Droz
reveal the overlapping relation between the two policies, writing, “[ivoirité] was a question of
redistributing to so-called true Ivorians political (state power), social (employment), and
economic (land, water bodies, forests) resources.”34 As policies and mobilizing tools, ivoirité and
the Land Act of 1998 at once honed in on political identity and rural dispossession, absorbing the
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energy of ethnically-based land claims and hostility to the outsiders who stood in the way of
them.
Explaining the Effect of Semi-Statist Land Management
Considered as outcomes, the contestation of land claims amongst national parties and the
adoption of ivoirité conform to the predictions of the hypothesis. I argue here that they originated
in the semi-statist management of the rural economy, referring to the legacy of “state facilitation
of massive immigration of agricultural colonists in the forest region since independence”35 and
the simultaneous acceptance of traditional, ethnicized authority over day-to-day land questions.
Since the rural socio-economic crisis was rooted in the Houphouëtist system, its
resolution could only be achieved by challenging and reconfiguring the state itself. Once it
became clear that the PDCI’s control of the state and its management of land was the source of
rural grievances, contestation had to be directed at the highest level of government in order to
resolve them. As we have seen, the parties sought to prove their governing effectiveness and win
supporters by elaborating new allocations of resources, which culminated for the countryside
with the Land Act of 1998. Unlike the previous cases, multiparty democracy responded to and
channeled rural unrest; voters mobilized in support of parties rather than with a transgressive
collective movement. Rural claims were, nonetheless, contested on a national, elevated level,
where state power could be won or at least effectively influenced to change. If Houphouëtist
management of the rural economy required that successful contestation be directed at upper
levels of government, multiparty democracy was the means by which that contestation
proceeded, providing vote-seeking parties with an incentive to respond to rural grievances.
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With respect to ivoirité, we must consider and show how the coexistence of traditional
and statist institutions in the countryside produced this virulent blending of nationalist and ethnic
political identity. Starting with its national component, Houphouëtism gave indigenous peasants
a common experience of unequal treatment vis-à-vis the migrant population that the state
welcomed and on whose behalf it intervened to allocate land. Mistrust of the PDCI’s old order
was a unifying characteristic for many indigenous Ivorians, making a political identity which
resonated with that group a valuable mobilizing tool for parties seeking to win voters. In this
sense, the actions of the state in rural society created a class of dispossessed farmers, that were
susceptible to xenophobic nationalism. Ultimately, it was the PDCI that reversed its stance on
immigration and first espoused ivoirité to win this constituency.
While obviously limited in its scope, Ivorité united ethnic identities based on an authentic
belonging to the national community. As parties challenged the state’s perceived favoritism of
non-nationals, they legitimized their claims with the element of civic national belonging
contained in ivoirité. Groups espousing it justified their struggle by appearing as the patriotic and
rightful inheritors of state power and resources, against a Houphouëtism that “privileges the
individual to the detriment of the citizen.”36 Since the allocation of state resources and power
both provoked the crisis and was being contested, ivoirité’s emphasis on citizenship and
attachment to the nation made it a compelling political identity in the struggles over who should
control the state and who should benefit from it. It effectively argued that the most “authentic”
members of the polity should be the first to benefit from the state’s support.
The ethnic component of ivoirité stemmed from the continued relevance of traditional
authority in the semi-statist system. In a society where traditional authorities were still
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recognized and where claims to land based on communal belonging were still considered
legitimate, ethnicity remained a salient force and a meaningful basis for claims-making. Semidirect rule, which mixed secular-modern and ethnicized authorities, allowed ethnicity to retain its
meaning and made it a politically relevant category, leading to its expression in ivoirité. Unlike
the Tanzanian case, for example, where a highly statist system mostly eradicated vestiges of
traditional authority and ethnic attachment, their continued existence in Ivorian society gave
them a solidity on which to make political claims. The Houphouëtist system, in its simultaneous
recognition of traditional and state authority over land, likewise generated the ethnic and
nationalist force of ivoirité.
Conclusion: The Legacy of Houphouëtism
For two decades after independence, the Ivorian polity was held together by the PDCI’s
patronal management of export-led development. The limits of the Houphouëtist system became
apparent in the 1980s and political-economic order began to erode with the closing of the forest
frontier and the end of the international commodity boom. Structural adjustment exacerbated the
system’s complications. In the ensuing crises of employment and land scarcity, social change
processes were unleashed and political opportunities opened up that spurred opposition
movements. Following democratization, the structural alienation of the fragmented southwestern
populations empowered the parties challenging the PDCI; again, the direct, unconstrained
influence of the state over the egalitarian societies of the forest frontier indicates the importance
of the social variable to the emergence of scaled-up contention. In this new context of multiparty competition, parties courted indigenous rural constituencies and aimed to address the rural
crisis by rewriting the land code and by redefining who would benefit from state support and
resources with ivoirité. As forms of scaled-up contestation and broad-based political identity,
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these outcomes are in line with the hypothesis. On the one hand, the state’s systematic
interventions in the rural economy were the target of change and the source of grievances. To be
successful and to strike at the root of the issue, contestation had to scale up to national party
politics and force changes in the highest levels of authority. The Land Act of 1998 was the result
of that contestation, which proceeded through mediatized and legislative debates from 1993
onward. As “the Ivorian iteration of modern nationalism,”37 Ivoirité emerged as a direct
challenge to the state’s openness to migrants, especially on the forest frontier. While a desire to
reclaim the state motivated the nationalist aspect of this political identity, it also drew strength
from the customary authorities and ethnic attachments that were allowed to thrive with the semistatist management of the rural economy.
The high-level contestation of land allocation and the introduction of ivoirité originated
in Houphouëtism. While on the surface appearing as measures for the reconstruction of a nationstate, the Land Act of 1998 and ivoirité were manipulated to divisive, xenophobic ends and
fueled indigenous attacks on foreigners. 38 Both of these phenomena ultimately contributed to the
intensification of unrest in Côte d’Ivoire and its descent into civil war at the beginning of the 21st
century. Having secured Côte d’Ivoire’s status as a developmental wonder in the 60s and 70s,
Houphouëtism and its ripple effects set the country against itself, which should be remembered
in debates of the Ivorian miracle and its long-term implications. Moreover, as the Ivorian case
demonstrates, it is important to note that instances in which peasant concerns impact national
politics will not necessarily result in a healthier, safer, or fairer society.
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Chapter IV: Rural Insurrection in Tigray, Ethiopia, 1975-1991
Introduction
This chapter tests the hypothesis against a case of armed peasant rebellion during the
1970s and 1980s in Tigray province, located in northern Ethiopia. Organized by the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the province’s rural population rebelled against the system of
direct rule under the communist military government, known as the Derg, which governed
Ethiopia starting in 1974. Having toppled the imperial regime of Haile Selassie, the Derg
initiated a radical program of land nationalization and statist control of the rural economy. These
programs, I will argue, caused the scaling up of the two aspects of peasant politics, contestation
strategies and political identities, analyzed in the preceding sections. Contestation strategies rose
to the national scale, in that they targeted the highest levels of state authority and brought
together rural Tigrayans in a regional insurgency. As for peasant political identities, the TPLF
employed a form of narrow ethno-nationalism, an outcome which, in its reliance on ethnicity,
diverges some from the hypothesis’ predictions. In the latter stages of its movement, the TPLF
embraced cooperation with other ethnic groups, which conforms more to the inclusive political
identities predicted by the hypothesis. I analyze these outcomes and test them against the
hypothesis in the argumentative section. The conclusion summarizes the chapter and refines the
role of social hierarchy as a variable within the hypothesis by comparing the differing outcomes
for peasant politics in Tigray and the groundnut basin, two hierarchical societies. Before
engaging the hypothesis, let us turn to the agricultural, social, and political context of the case.
Tigray under Imperial Rule
This section will first provide an overview of Tigrayan agriculture and society, which
were based on a form of feudalism that linked the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the ruling
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nobility, and the peasantry. The second half of the section describes the center-periphery relation
between the imperial central government and the province during the 20th century and in the lead
up to the 1974 military coup that deposed Emperor Haile Selassie. This perspective on prerevolutionary Tigrayan society and politics will help to contextualize the disruptions and
subsequent grievances produced by the Derg’s interventions.
Tigray is located on the northern plateau of present-day Ethiopia, at altitudes ranging
from 1500 to 10000 feet above sea level.1 Flat-topped mesas and deep gorges cover the region,
giving it a topographical uniqueness. With erratic rainfall, severe droughts and consequent
famines have plagued the region, notably from 1888-1892, 1973-1974, and 1984-1985.2 Despite
semi-arid growing conditions, fixed agriculture is used to principally grow cereals, such as
barley, wheat, and sorghum.3 Fertile soils support these crops but are highly susceptible to
erosion as a result of vegetation clearance.4 Historically, Tigray was wealthy relative to the rest
of the Ethiopian empire, with a solid productive output. Writing about 16th century Tigray, a
Portuguese missionary commented, “‘it seems to me that in the whole world there is not so
populous a country or one so abundant in crops’” and that inhabitants “‘gathered so much crops
of all kinds that were it not for the worm, there would have been abundance for ten years.’”5
This agricultural resplendence stemmed from Tigray’s advantageous position within the
political order of the Ethiopian Empire, which was based on an alliance between the Amhara and
the Tigrayan peoples. Together, these two groups of the larger region known as Abyssinia
controlled a centralized Christian empire, whose rulers claimed a line of descent from King
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Solomon and the Queen of Sheba.6 Tribute and loyalty flowed from provincial governors to the
emperor, who conquered neighboring lands and dispensed justice with divine authority.
Underpinning political order in Tigray was a system of indirect rule, in which “emperors had to
depend on local leaders and… the ancient practice of building political loyalty through dynastic
marriages in the province.”7 In the late 19th and 20th centuries, shifts in the locus of political
power and disruptions produced by Italian incursions exacerbated relations between Tigray and
Shoa, the imperial and Amhara-dominated capital. Such changes led to the economic
marginalization and impoverishment of the region, although it retained a cohesive social
organization and strong cultural identity.
Traditional Tigrayan society was highly stratified, being organized around “the classic
trinity of noble, priest, and peasant.”8 Up to the revolution in 1974, rural society was feudal,
hierarchical, and largely unchanged over the past 500 years. 9 Peasants practiced fixed
subsistence agriculture, yet sustained the Church and rulers, both of which heavily taxed their
surplus production and demanded uncompensated labor. 10 The peasantry was “traditionally
taxed to the limits of its capacity” to support the rest of the social pyramid.11 In return for their
labor and tribute, peasants could depend on the local gentry for assistance in times of crisis and
on the Church for salvation. Markakis notes that the counterbalance to steep inequality was a
degree of “vertical integration which tends to diminish class antagonism to vanishing point.”12
The vertical integration described by Markakis was reinforced by kinship ties between peasants,
nobles and priests as well as Church teachings that linked the social order with divine will. A
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Church pamphlet from the 1960s warned peasants against ambitions of drastic social
advancement, asserting that “any human creature should keep his position in the hierarchy and
know his capacity, and if he lives according to the position assigned to him by fate, he will have
no regrets about himself or God.”13 It was, however, possible for a peasant to join the ranks of
the priesthood or become a local ruler. Moreover, there was little difference in material wealth
and cultural life between the lowest members of the ruling class and priesthood on the one hand,
and the peasantry on the other. Close contact between the humblest priests and rulers minimized
the sense of distance between the peasants and the non-productive classes as a whole, which
enhanced social cohesion. Reinforced by familial bonds and the secular and religious upper
classes’ promises of worldly and spiritual security, there was a fatalistic continuity to traditional
life, although there was no shortage of small-scale rebellions and sayings that pointed to the
harshness of life for the average rural Tigrayan.
In this agricultural society, land was the most important economic asset and the systems
used to govern it implicated all sections of the population. For the peasantry, access to land was
determined by membership in the extended family or kinship group of an ancestor that was said
to have first cleared land or to have received it from a royal grant. In order to receive a plot of the
ancestral estate, it was necessary to prove one’s lineage through documentation. Such claims
were respected and authenticated by the local secular and religious authorities. Elders of the
kinship groups were responsible for allocating the land of the hereditary estates to land rightsentitled family members, which essentially accounted for all Tigrayan peasants. This system in
which land rights were allocated according to descent was called rist. Markakis summarizes the
condition of the peasantry within this traditional tenure system, noting:
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The Christian peasantry of the northern provinces has always been a smallholder group
with secure rights to land. The rist system of landholding ensures that practically
everyone holds land…. Although it promotes fragmentation of holdings, this system has
prevented land alienation and the emergence of a landless class.14
The rist system thus provided a stable foundation for the continuation of peasant economic
activity, within a highly exploitative social structure and in the face of occasional droughts. State
and Church recognition ensured the legitimacy and normal functioning of the system.
In light of the stability of peasant agriculture and its integration into a hierarchical, yet
cohesive social order, pre-revolutionary rural Tigray does not appear as a region that would
foster a massive uprising of small farmers. Forms of social control and relationships of
dependence that would inhibit the formation of a broad-based peasant movement were deeply
entrenched, as in the groundnut basin of Senegal. Frustration over land rights would, moreover,
be directed to the elders of the kinship group as the authority over land, confining conflict to the
local parish and the hereditary estate. The juxtaposition of this historic background of peasant
acquiescence with the rural insurgency that appeared in the wake of the 1974 revolution draws
out important implications for the argument, specifically regarding what changed such that the
peasants became motivated to engage in a broad-based uprising. As I will argue below, the
creation of direct rule institutions to govern the rural economy altered peasant-state relations
such that insurgency became a viable and necessary contestation strategy.
The Politics of Centralization in Tigray: End of the 19th Century to the Eve of Revolution
Even before the communist Derg had levelled the rural hierarchy to make way for direct
rule, that form of government was taking shape in rural Ethiopia after Emperor Haile Selassie
had initiated a campaign of centralization, aiming to undermine the regional nobility and increase
the state’s presence in the lives of its subjects. In Tigray, this trend in centralization was tainted
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by a regional sense of betrayal and marginalization. As nobles and peasants felt the pains of
Amhara domination, the centralization program only exacerbated an already fraught relation
between the region and the imperial government.
Tigrayan frustration with the Amharan government was the product of a confluence of
negative experiences across the region, beginning in the 1880s with the Italian invasion of the
province of Eritrea, just north of Tigray. There was a large Tigrigna speaking population in
Eritrea, who shared an affinity with their co-linguists to the south, linking the peoples of the two
provinces. Tigrayans were dismayed when the Amharan Emperor Menelik signed the Treaty of
Wichale on May 2, 1889, that recognized Italian sovereignty over Eritrea.15 After years of
fighting, the forfeiture of the northern province was a stinging defeat for Tigrayans, who viewed
the emperor’s agreement with the Italians as an indication of the expendability of non-Amharan
peoples within the framework of the empire. Moreover, the sense of betrayal was heightened by
the outcome of negotiations after Menelik’s forces defeated the Italians and halted their
southward advance at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. Instead of using the victory to regain lost
territories, Menelik continued to recognize Italian control of Eritrea, reinforcing Tigrayan
mistrust of the center.
The temporary peace with Italy served to further marginalize Tigrayans at the turn of the
twentieth century. Having held the Italians at bay, the imperial center began a campaign of
southern expansion, capturing fertile farmlands that were suitable for coffee production.16 The
primary benefactors of this expansion were Amharan elites and court favorites, who received
large estates and thus reinforced their economic dominance. Within the empire’s socio-economic
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system, the disparity between the Tigrayan and Amharan groups, despite their shared claims to
imperial authority and preeminence, grew wider as a result of the southern land distributions.
With expansion-minded colonizers on its northern border, Tigray effectively became a
buffer zone in the Amharan empire’s protracted struggles to maintain its territorial integrity
against Egyptian and Italian invaders. Elaborating on Tigray’s suffering as a result of its location
relative to competing hostile forces, Young writes,
Some twenty major battles were fought on Tigrayan soil between the Battle of Adwa and
the Italian invasion of 1935. The armies that fought these invaders and various rival
Tigrayan factions were primarily made up of peasants who were forced to feed the
armies and suffered the depredations of the wars they brought to their lands. With no
salaries (until the formation of a professional army in 1941) or even regular food
supplies, it was common practice for soldiers to feed themselves at the expense of the
peasants whose lands they traversed. Indeed, pillaging from the peasants and collecting
war booty were the soldiers’ chief incentives for joining the army.17
Tigray thus sunk into poverty under the burden of such frequent warfare, the effects of which
were compounded by frequent famines throughout the first quarter of the 20th century. Tigrayans
were increasingly economically differentiated from the Amharans and more than ever attributed
their grievances to Shoa, giving rise to the first indications of ethno-nationalist sentiments.18
Italian colonial aspirations were reinvigorated as Benito Mussolini’s fascist party came to
power in 1922, espousing a vision of returning Rome to its former glory.19 Italian activities,
aiming to undermine the integrity of Haile-Selassie’s empire, would have important
consequences for the relationship between Tigray and the center. Notably, the Italians’ “Tigrayan
policy” consisted of a subversive propaganda campaign that specifically played off of regional
disenchantment with Amhara domination.20 Rome hoped to drive a wedge between the non-
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Amhara peoples and the center and thereby bring about more favorable conditions for its
impending invasion.
The Italians invaded Ethiopia by way of Tigray in 1935, ultimately gaining control of
Shoa and Addis Ababa in 1936. Having been abandoned by Haile-Selassie during the army’s
early strategic retreats, Tigrayans seriously questioned their allegiance to the center. 21 Moreover,
the investments that followed from Italian colonization proved to be more alluring than the
economic marginalization Tigrayans had endured previously. Many Tigrayans began to
acquiesce to and even embrace the colonialists and their modernization projects, such was the
extent of their disillusionment under the old imperial order. Italian colonization brought with it
modern amenities, such as hospitals and schools, and infrastructural improvements that had been
severely lacking.
After British and Ethiopian resistance forces drove out the Italians in 1941, Haile Selassie
reclaimed his throne and sought to reconstitute his authority and tax-base through a new program
of centralization, although he faced stern resistance in Tigray. With bitter memories of Amhara
domination still fresh in their minds, Tigrayans were reluctant to resubmit to Haile Selassie’s
order, which was increasingly represented by Amhara bureaucrats, as agents of a governmental
modernization process, instead of local nobles. “Angered by Haile Selassie’s new
administration… Tigrayan nobles encouraged peasant resistance and gave it a populist antiShoan character.”22 Regional anger against the returning government’s ethnically skewed
centralization culminated in a full-fledged rural rebellion, known as the Weyane.23 This uprising
brought together a diverse set of actors in defiance of the imperial state, such as the
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“semipastoral communities of southern Tigray,… sectarian nobility,… and highland cultivators,”
all of which were in some way opposed to the configuration and prospects of renewed Amharan
rule. 24
The Weyane uprising ended with Haile Selassie granting concessions to Tigrayan
interests and was a clear manifestation of the tense center-periphery relationship that
characterized this region of Ethiopia in the first half of the 20th century. The Weyane prefigures
the TPLF’s insurgency in that, in both cases, the center alienated regional groups as a result of its
attempts to increase its ability to intervene in daily life, to advance a form of direct rule.
Regional frustrations would continue to simmer in the years leading up to the Derg’s
seizure of power in 1974. But the history of Tigrayan-Shoan relations indicates the difficulty the
Derg would face in attempting to assimilate the region to its highly centralized framework.
Given its history, Tigray was largely disillusioned by promises of socialist incorporation under
another distant government. Decades of marginalization linked Tigrayan identity with central
oppression and ethno-nationalist sentiments were increasingly vibrant in towns before and after
the revolution. Such historical grievances would be fundamental to the rallying message
espoused by the Tigrayan student movement in its mobilization of the peasantry. Before the
TPLF organized its rural revolt, the disaffected urban military officers of the Derg toppled Haile
Selassie and seized power, ushering in a socialist government that aspired to centralization far
beyond that which had occurred under the imperial regime.
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The Fall of the Imperial Regime
On top of the center-periphery tensions just discussed, the imperial regime faced the ire
of an emergent and demanding urban middle-class, whose unrest would provide the impetus for
the coup that deposed Haile Selassie. While a full account of the coup is beyond the scope of this
study and not necessary to it, suffice it to say that it was brought on by the imperial regime’s
inability to respond to the demands for greater political representation, a higher quality of life,
and secure employment of the urban students, teachers, bureaucrats, laborers, and industrialists,
many of whom were themselves products of the state’s modernization and centralization
projects.25 Unrest mounted throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, as the regime responded either
half-heartedly to reform demands or not at all. As time passed, urban actors were organizing and
increasingly disaffected with the old order and its lagging adaptation to patterns of
modernization. It was in this context of middle-class frustration that a group of “about 120 noncommissioned officers, enlisted soldiers, and radical junior officers with ties to the
intelligentsia… overthrew the imperial regime in February 1974 and formed the de facto
government, the Provisional Military Administration Council.”26 Themselves a fraction of the
angry urban classes, the mid and low-level soldiers of the Derg seized on the political
opportunity created by burgeoning resentment of the imperial regime.
With a number of political organizations seeking to upend the traditional order, the
Derg’s authority was fragile at best in the aftermath of the coup. Diverse nationalist and Marxist
student groups jockeyed for influence, each envisioning different strategies for engaging the
military government, yet adding to the confusion. In the midst of the transitional disorder, the
Derg worked quickly to consolidate its power in both the cities and the countryside. First, it won
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urban support with its promises of progressive socialism, despite the constant suspicion of the
radical student groups, which included the TPLF. It then extended its base of support to the rural
masses by nationalizing land with the Land Proclamation of 4 March 1975. Indicating the
political expediency of this reform, Young notes that “the agrarian transformation… had as much
to do with the regime’s survival than any commitment to scientific socialism.”27 Between these
two strategic appeals, the Derg was able to dispel some of the uncertainty surrounding its claim
to power and to win the popular legitimacy it needed in the aftermath of the coup.
Despite ongoing contestation from urban student groups, the Derg set out to construct a
highly centralized party-state and socialized economic planning throughout Ethiopia. Having
traced out the relevant history of Tigrayan society and politics and the Derg’s ascent to power,
we may now begin to consider in greater detail the implications of its land nationalization for the
rural population, that policy being the basis for a new system of direct rule in the countryside. It
is direct rule, I will argue, that ultimately transformed peasant politics, raising them up to the
regional and national levels.
Nationalization of Land and the Emergence of Rural Unrest
The nationalization decree remade the political economy of rural Ethiopia, bringing with
it a more intensive form of direct rule than the one that had evolved incompletely under Haile
Selassie’s centralization reforms. Where the nascent bureaucracy had to appease traditional
nobles under the imperial political system,28 the military government aimed to fully eradicate
remaining vestiges of feudalism and to bring the rural economy under its complete control.
Nationalization furthermore had significant impacts on the production and livelihoods of the

27

Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, 60.
Cohen and Weintraub, Land and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia: The Social Background to a Revolution (Assen:
Van Gorcum, 1975), 91.
28

72

peasantry. Where agricultural modernization would have destabilized the powerbase of the rural
leaders and therefore the old political order, the Derg set out to accelerate rural economic
development, adhering to its ideology in the face of the hostility of traditional leaders, yet failing
to achieve the desired results. It is the interaction between direct rule and the detrimental
outcomes of the Derg’s statist agriculture that would ultimately stimulate new forms of political
action in rural Tigray and to which we now turn. I will first discuss the statist land reform,
analyzing it in relation to the direct rule of rural society. After focusing on nationalization, I will
then move to collectivization, these two programs being the core elements of direct rule in the
countryside. I will then provide an overview of the experiences of Tigrayan peasants under the
statist agricultural system, which initiated their disaffection from and ultimate rebellion against
the Derg.
Beginning with nationalization, the Land Proclamation of 1975 recast the socioeconomic
organization of rural Tigray, sweeping away the hereditary land tenure system and dispossessing
the Church and the local nobility of their large holdings.29 It declared that “all rural lands shall be
collective property of the Ethiopian people” and that local Peasant Associations were to
administer centrally drawn territorial plots.30 Peasant households were to be granted rights over
the land they worked and the sale or transfer of land was forbidden. Smallholders throughout the
country hailed these redistributive promises and looked forward to a life free from the grinding
taxation of their traditional overlords.31
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The nationalization of land and the establishment of the Peasant Associations brought the
party-state into closer contact with the rural population and gave it a new presence in peasant
life. The Peasant Associations were “made up of all household heads in each community, and
they were given authority to redistribute land, maintain common assets, resolve conflicts and
enable development activities taking place in their areas.”32 While these structures were intended
“to serve as a form of popular self-administration,” they in reality became local-level extensions
of the state, falling under the sway of party favorites.33 This cooptation allowed the state to
penetrate further into daily rural life; the Peasant Associations provided an additional means by
which the state “[carried] out a variety of political functions, including collecting taxes,
maintaining law and order, channeling directives to the peasantry, enforcing the… grain
requisition programmes and later recruiting young men for the military.”34 Using the Peasant
Associations and the apparatus of rural administration in general, the Derg imposed numerous
taxes on peasant producers as well as a grain quota to be exchanged for cash via the state’s
marketing board.35 By many accounts, the various contributions demanded of the peasantry were
crushing and excessive.
Direct rule of the countryside thus intensified following nationalization, with the
structures of statist land administration serving as additional channels of coercion, taxation, and
intervention. Nationalization “cleared the way for direct access to the peasantry…. The object [of
which] was to make demands on peasant resources – taxes, ‘contributions,’ food or cash crops,
free labor… and to prepare peasants for the government’s socialist ventures such as cooperatives,
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villagization, and resettlement schemes.”36 While the Derg was unable to extend its influence to
all corners of Tigray, with outlying western regions under the control of rebel movements from
the early days of the coup onward, it is safe to say that the population in non-rebel areas
recognized the state as, or at least its intent to be, the authority over land and the rural economy
generally.37 That the old system of land tenure had been terminated throughout the province38
indicates that the peasants had acknowledged land would be governed by the central state and its
agents. The creation of the Peasant Associations and national ownership of land were the first
and most important extensions of direct rule, which would continue to materialize with
agricultural collectivization, as well as preparatory resettlement and villagization schemes, in the
early 1980s. The nationalization reforms paved the way for these high-modernist socialization
programs, all of which would be based upon the state’s complete control over the allocation of
land.39 Although they were haphazardly implemented and limited in scope, these programs were
nonetheless further indications of the state’s willingness to intervene in rural life.
Collectivized agriculture contrasted sharply with the historic experience of individualized
peasant production in Tigray. To be sure, Tigrayan peasants were deeply embedded in communal
bonds but farming was an individual affair, meant to sustain the household and meet the
taxational obligations it owed to the Church and nobility. Where the traditional system was based
on self-reliance for subsistence, collectivization aimed to use communal ownership of resources
for the sake of increased productivity; the means and the ends of the rural economy were to be
reworked.
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In addition to administrative challenges related to the coordination of the reforms, such a
drastic reorganization of economic life entailed cultural friction with a peasantry unaccustomed
to the mode of agriculture proposed by collectivization. Working against the tide of tradition, the
Derg began the collectivization process in the late 1970s. While only a small percentage of
agricultural land was successfully given over to collective farms, doing so nevertheless involved
a high degree of state intervention and lasting effects on rural communities. The appropriation of
productive land and the forced resettlement of peasants to work there were requisite measures.
The peasants who worked on them moreover encountered a mismanaged and restrictive system,
described in greater detail by Rahmato:
In the majority of [collective farms], the holdings that were being worked were small in
relative terms. Each co-operator in Arsi province, for example, often worked less than the
average individual peasant in the same province. Co-operatives thus did not benefit from
scale of operations or from more efficient deployment of labor. Moreover the enterprises
were just as constrained by a shortage of draught animals (their main traction power) as
individual cultivators. Co-operative labor was organized on a ‘work gang’ basis but the
gangs were rarely formed on the basis of compatibility, ability or performance. The
result was less intensive labor, delays in completing necessary tasks, and low output. The
system of remuneration… was not well received by many peasants because they believed
it encouraged shirking, incompetence and waste.40
In light of such conditions, the productive outcomes of the collective farms fell far short of what
was envisioned for them and, from 1980 to 1988, produced less per hectare on average than
individually managed farms.41
In Tigray specifically, the Derg established collective farms in the southern portions of
the province and relocated peasants to work on them.42 Young notes that “these co-operatives
were resented by indigenous residents, some of whom were killed by the Derg for resisting them.
In the event the scheme did not prove successful, apparently because of the difficulty
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individualistic Tigrayan peasants had in working collectively.”43 Although it was implemented
only in a portion of Tigray, collectivization served as an indication of the state’s prerogative over
land and its intent to intervene in peasant life. Whether they worked on a collective farm or had
merely heard about them, rural populations throughout Tigray became aware of the Derg’s
presence in their daily affairs in the late 1970s and early 1980s as news of collectivization and
resettlements circulated. Collectivization thus represented a novel, looming aspect of direct rule
for rural Tigrayans and Ethiopians in general. Along with nationalization reforms and the activity
of the Peasant Associations, such manifestations of direct rule of land would, according to the
hypothesis, drive peasants to target the state and to mobilize in numbers in order resolve
grievances related to land and, in this more expansive case, the rural economy.
Although they were initially welcoming of the Derg’s equalizing reforms, Tigrayan
peasants soon became disaffected with the new system. As noted above, the numerous
frustrations that arose from direct rule of rural life included crushing taxation, ineffective and
unfair management of agricultural resources, and authoritarian administration, conditions which
were exacerbated by famines in the late 1970s and 1980s. The combination of miserable levels of
productivity and insatiable state demands pushed the peasantry to reject the Derg. Ultimately,
“the seeds of [the military regime’s] humiliating downfall were sown by its own doctrinaire
agrarian policies, which led to the hardening of peasant-state relations, and eventually to the
complete alienation of the peasantry from the regime.”44
The experience of direct rule, therefore, primed the Tigrayan peasantry for mobilization.
Using McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s interactive framework of mobilization, we can elucidate the
causal mechanisms of Tigrayan revolt. Firstly, the miserable experience of direct rule, in this
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case the relevant social change process, caused the peasantry to engage in threat attribution,
seeing the Derg as an enemy. The disaffection of the rural population thus provided an opening
for urban-rural brokerage, an opportunity which the established, yet city-centered TPLF used to
venture into the countryside and mobilize the peasantry for its ethno-nationalist struggle.45 Using
its organizational resources, the TPLF initiated a process of social appropriation, sending out
insurgent recruiters to tap into rural social networks and incorporate peasant villages into their
movement. Feudalism’s residual forms of social integration, comprised of kinship networks, the
parish community, and the authority of village elders and local notables, were the organizational
footholds that the TPLF could exploit to mobilize the rural masses. Indeed, brokerage and social
appropriation fit squarely within the TPLF’s mobilization of the peasantry, in that they are the
“processes by which well-defined oppositional groups seek to appropriate the routine identities
and everyday networks of shared fate and trust of previously inactive (or, at best, marginally
active) social groupings.”46 By way of these processes, beginning with threat attribution as a
consequence of a grinding system of direct rule and ending with the incorporation of peasants
into its movement, the TPLF mobilized the hitherto disengaged peasantry.
With a statist system of rural economic planning in place, Tigrayan peasants came into
direct contact with the state in their daily lives and felt its demands in the form of taxes and
quotas. As the central state became the primary authority over peasant livelihoods, the
hypothetical conditions were set for the emergence of contestation strategies capable of
challenging state policies and the activation of political identities that transcend ethnic
boundaries. Having laid out the system of direct rule, the grievances that arose under it, and the
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mobilization of the rural population, let us now turn to the forms of peasant politics that emerged
in this context.
Ethno-Nationalism and Rural Insurrection in Tigray
I argue here that direct rule of land caused Tigrayan peasant politics, in the forms of
contestation strategies and political identities, to take on a regional scope in order to challenge
the national government. I first show that direct rule channeled peasant contestation strategies
upwards to the regional level, as manifested by the rural insurgency that sought to drive the Derg
out of Tigray. Throughout that struggle, the political identity adopted by peasant insurgents was
based on ethno-nationalism and the desire for inclusive self-determination of ethnic groups
within the Ethiopian political system. Seeing as Tigrayan ethnic identity retained its salience,
instead of ceding to a regional or national identity that explicitly accommodated multiple
ethnicities, this outcome diverges to some extent from what the hypothesis predicts of peasant
political identities under direct rule. These discrepancies between hypothesis and observed
outcome stem from the historic differential treatment of non-Amhara peoples within the imperial
system, which reinforced ethnic groups by giving each a unique experience of subjugation.
Ethnic self-determination within the structure of Ethiopian politics thus became a prominent
theme for the urban leaders of many of the anti-Derg movements, including the TPLF.47
Nevertheless, since the TPLF members’ political identity was premised on a notion of selfdetermination within a poly-ethnic Ethiopia, we do see an affiliation with the national polity,
which is more in line with the hypothesis. This section elaborates on these arguments regarding
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peasant contestation strategies and political identities, first detailing what forms they took and
then showing how direct rule scaled them upwards to be forces in national politics.
Having rejected the Derg’s management of rural society, peasants engaged in regionwide
collective action to challenge the state by supporting the TPLF, usually as militia members, but
also as informants and logistical aides. This contestation strategy spread across the province and
the TPLF soon became the dominant anti-Derg movement in Tigray as it gained the backing of
the rural masses.48 The core of the TPLF’s armed forces consisted of peasants who engaged in
guerilla warfare, carrying out attacks on central government outposts and skirmishing with the
Ethiopian military.49 Peasants moreover joined the leadership ranks of the TPLF and enacted
administrative reforms in areas under the movement’s control, taking on new roles in a
democratized system of government.50 For example, “the TPLF ensured that their [land reform
program]… was carried out by the peasants.”51 Other administrative reforms instituted under the
TPLF included a court system and committees of elected community members focusing on
social issues such as health and education. Political contestation, in this sense, meant not only
waging guerilla war but also the creation of a region-specific system of government, in place of
central control. The peasantry and the TPLF thus implicitly challenged the overall configuration
of political authority, driving out the Derg’s military and administration and asserting a form of
self-government across Tigray.52
Between the armed insurgency and the creation of a new administrative system, such
direct assertions of regional authority demonstrate the scaling up of peasant politics; peasant
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contestation strategies aimed to secure the TPLF’s authority throughout Tigray. What brought
about this transformation was the structural necessity of replacing the existing form of direct
rule, which had come to be seen as detrimental to the interests of rural Tigrayans. Young notes
the causal link between direct rule and scaled-up peasant insurrection that targeted the state,
writing “the desire to transform both Tigray and its relationship with the state was the
fundamental reason why the TPLF launched its revolution, but realizing this objective could only
come about through successfully waging revolutionary war.”53 With the system of authoritarian
direct rule being the cause of unrest, the resolution of peasant grievances required that political
action be directed at the institution from which they originated. Where peasant grievances
stemmed from direct rule by the military government, political action aimed at resolving them
needed to be of a scale and scope capable of changing the character of that form of government.
In line with this objective, the rural insurgency struck at the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian
state and self-government aimed to replace it altogether in Tigray. From the perspective of the
peasantry, both of these contestation strategies became foreseeably effective in the context of
grievances produced by direct rule, leading to their adoption.
As members of the TPLF, peasants adopted rural insurgency and self-government
because such contestation strategies could reasonably challenge the Derg’s direct rule. In this
way, the structure of politics delineated the form of political action, causing rural voices and
aspirations to impact on a national level and forcing their consideration at the highest level of
government. In March of 1990, the last days of its existence, the Derg attempted to regain
peasant support by introducing a raft of rural reforms that would relax some of the demands of
the centralized economy. “The regime was forced to concede [the reforms]… by the escalating

53

Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, 172.

81

anti-government insurgency in the countryside,” now in virtually all rural areas. 54 Though the
response was too late to regain peasant support, the Derg’s concessions and, more importantly,
its overthrow by a coalition of TPLF-led ethno-nationalist groups in 1991 indicate the extent to
which peasant rebellion succeeded in challenging the state’s management of the rural economy.
Turning now to the form of political identity that emerged with the TPLF’s struggle,
there are important differences between the ethnically-based identity that unified the TPLF and
the more inclusive ones that the hypothesis predicts will be adopted by rural groups under direct
rule. Throughout the TPLF’s insurrection, supporters adopted ethno-nationalist political
identities, that were inspired by a vision of “national self-determination against an oppressive
state.”55 Tigrayan ethnicity, based on “economic interdependence, common language, religion,
culture and history,”56 was the unifying force of the movement. Young notes that “The TPLF, a
movement based on ethnic identity, not surprisingly found its appeal limited when attempting to
attract support outside its ethnic core.”57 The exclusive nature of this ethnic political identity
was, however, counterbalanced by the desire for self-determination within the greater Ethiopian
polity and to “find a lasting space in Ethiopian power politics.”58 That is, the potential for
cooperation in a reconfigured, ethnically equalized Ethiopia was fundamental to TPLF
supporters.
To be sure, the ethnic narrowness of the TPLF’s political identity diverges from the
predictions of the hypothesis. The explanation for the observed outcomes lies in the nature of the
Ethiopian political system and its reification of ethnicity, specifically the Tigrayan experience of
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economic marginalization in the last century of the empire. The Ethiopian state’s historical
association with Amhara domination, the political source of Tigrayan suffering, made the
national question of paramount importance to the TPLF. Tigray’s liberation, it was determined,
could only be achieved with a reorganization of the relationship between the central government
and the minorities within Ethiopia’s “prison house of nationalities.”59 The ethnic basis of the
structural imbalance in Ethiopia accentuated the sense of alienation from the national
government, even with the rise to power of the Derg, which was seen as only another iteration of
Amhara domination. Moreover, the Derg’s explicitly nationalist rhetoric, exemplified by its
“Ethiopia First” slogan, discounted that form of political identity,60 despite its potential for
greater inclusivity and recruitment into the TPLF forces.
Under these conditions, direct rule of the countryside and the Derg’s attempts to promote
Ethiopian identity were not capable of defusing the salience of ethnicity. The historical
experience of marginalization based on ethnicity had given that identity a powerful basis in
political life and the TPLF understood the suffering of Tigrayans in ethnic terms, as nonAmharans. Moreover, direct rule by the Derg was continually challenged by the TPLF, limiting
the extent to which national identities could be consolidated around a relationship with the
central state. Finally, where the Derg had asserted direct rule, the suffering associated with the
system of government made nationalism and any rhetorical association with it all the less
attractive as a political identity.
Compared with the earlier cases of regionalism observed in Lower Casamance and
nationalism in Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire, the ethno-nationalism of the TPLF is a less inclusive
form of political identity. It is important, however, to acknowledge the TPLF’s attachment to
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Ethiopian cohesion, demonstrated by the desire for self-determination within the territory of the
existing state. This attachment conforms to the hypothesis’ predictions, in that it represents a
broadening of political identity, albeit a minor one, seeing as the TPLF aimed to rework the
relationship between Tigray and the central state and ultimately to maintain it. 61 If this aspect of
the observed political identity conforms to the hypothesis’ predictions, in what way did direct
rule produce this outcome? The answer stems from the strategic conditions of the rebellions
produced under the Derg’s system of government. Having alienated numerous other ethnic
groups and their associated rebel movements through the system of direct rule, with its
convoluted economic organization and heavy taxational burdens, the Derg made itself the target
of a collection of aggrieved minorities. Sharing a desire to overturn the central government, yet
only capable of doing so in conjunction, the various ethnic rebellions found ethno-nationalism to
be a politically advantageous strategy.62 As the struggle against the Derg progressed, the TPLF
sought to further articulate its vision of ethnic federalism, which the TPLF leaders could use to
their strategic advantage in leading and/or joining forces with other ethnic movements.63 Though
direct rule under both Haile Selassie and the Derg proved to be catastrophic for Tigrayans, a
federalized version of it was enticing for the TPLF and shaped its rhetoric, demonstrated by the
sense of belonging to the Ethiopian polity that characterized the group’s political identity. Direct
rule thus influenced Tigrayan ethno-nationalism to the extent that political identity was derived
from the strategic conditions that emerged as a result of that system of government. In other
words, direct rule united the disparate fronts by giving them a shared enemy and thereby

Berhe, “Tigray People’s Liberation Front,” 4.
Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, 221.
63
Jean-Nicolas Bach, “EPRDF’s Nation-Building: Tinkering with Convictions and Pragmatism,” Cadernos de
Estudos Africanos, no. 27 (2014), 4.
61
62

84

influenced the calculations of their leaders regarding the long term effectiveness of an ethnonationalism that promised cohesion amongst the ethnicities.
In the latter stages of the rebellion against the Derg, Tareke commented, “Now that the
TPLF has moved from the regional to the national terrain, criticizing its initial actions as
manifestations of ‘narrow nationalist deviations,’…. The front will have to repoliticize ethnicity
for purposes of national unity.”64 Ultimately, the TPLF led the coalition that ultimately
overthrew the military government, known as the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF), and, in doing so, laid the foundation for ethnic federalism in
contemporary Ethiopia. To this day, the ethno-national basis of political identity, as well as the
TPLF’s rural mobilization are of great importance to contemporary Ethiopian politics, having
become aspects of state tradition.65
Conclusion: Comparing the Effect of Hierarchy on Peasant Politics
After outlining the history of Tigrayan agricultural society and the region’s relations with
the successive central governments, this chapter argued that direct rule caused rural Tigrayans to
engage in scaled-up contestation strategies that impacted on the highest levels of Ethiopian
politics. Peasant participation in those strategies, which were armed insurgency and selfadministration, was facilitated by the TPLF. This urban group mobilized the peasantry by
exploiting the brokerage opportunity created by rural alienation from the military government
and its statist agriculture. While the outcomes for peasant contestation strategies corresponded to
the hypothesis’ predictions, the ethno-national political identity that initially unified the TPLF’s
movement diverged from them. The movement’s emphasis on Tigrayan ethnicity was rooted in
Ethiopia’s imperial system, whose structural inequalities put regional groups in tension with the
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Amhara leadership and central government. Nationalism, at this point associated with a new
iteration of centralized domination, was not a relevant political identity and the experience of
common oppression associated with the ethnic group gave narrower ethno-nationalism a greater
motivating capacity. As the TPLF expanded beyond its regional base, the strategic benefits of
emphasizing self-determination within the Ethiopian polity led to the modification of the
movement’s political identity, so as to create cohesion amongst the various other ethnic
rebellions in their attempt to overthrow the Derg. Direct rule led to the broadening of political
identities in that it provided a common enemy that the TPLF and other ethnic movements
toppled, under the unified banner of the EPRDF.
Considering the conditions that produced these outcomes, the variable of hierarchy,
which hitherto has not been discussed in this chapter, must not be discounted, yet its effect is
only now apparent. Comparing the groundnut basin and Tigray province, cases of feudal
societies which responded differently to the presence of central state authority, reveals that
mobilization of hierarchical groups depends on the degree of those groups’ incorporation or
marginalization within the state’s political order. Up until this case study, hierarchy was closely
correlated with incorporation, regional bargaining power, and constraints on state penetration.
Given the unique history of Ethiopian state-building, which differed from the experiences of the
former colonies of French West Africa, these associations did not hold up. Where the experience
of oppression within the imperial political order conditioned the rebellion in hierarchical Tigray,
the marabout elites of the groundnut basin came to an agreement with the Senegalese socialist
party in order to maintain their interests. In these two cases, mobilization depended on the
hierarchy’s level of incorporation into the central state’s political framework. Seeing little hope
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of advancement under yet another distant government, Tigrayan actors engaged in collective
action to challenge the Ethiopian state.
Moreover, Tigrayan hierarchy influenced the political identity adopted by the TPLF. As
hierarchy brought with it socio-cultural reproduction, it in turn provided an array symbols,
memories, and traditions, that served as resources for an ethno-national political identity.66
Similarly, the vertical integration referred to by Markakis solidified the bonds of the Tigrayan
ethnicity and reinforced group members’ sense of belonging to it. Through cultural and social
connections, hierarchy bolstered the salience of ethnicity and gave it political force for the TPLF,
leading to its adoption of ethno-nationalism. To recalibrate the hypothesis to match this outcome,
it should predict unincorporated, hierarchical groups to adopt somewhat more exclusive political
identities, which adhere to the culture and social bonds of the group. These, it should be
remembered, will remain flexible as contestation spreads and makes narrower identities less
palpable for disparate groups, as observed in the TPLF’s emphasis on self-determination and
cooperation amongst the oppressed nationalities.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
This study was inspired by a desire to understand the emergence of broad-based peasant
movements in Africa. In seeking to understand under what conditions small farmers collectively
challenge state power, in a direct way that goes beyond the “second best” tactics of evasion and
passive resistance, I hoped to shed light on an aspect of peasant politics that had not been
covered by the voluminous accounts of exploitation, dispossession, and urban-bias. Over the
course of this work, I honed in on the structure of rural societies and state intervention in land
and agriculture as the critical variables in explaining where nationally significant peasant
movements emerge. As demonstrated by the case studies of the groundnut basin and Lower
Casamance in Senegal and the cocoa frontier of Côte d’Ivoire, state penetration could be loosely
gauged by the political strength of the rural society it encountered. In Lower Casamance and in
the forest region of Côte d’Ivoire, nascent states managed land and agriculture with minimal
initial resistance from the fragmented, acephalous societies of these areas. The marabout leaders
of the groundnut basin, on the other hand, were able to use their political and economic weight to
curtail the state’s influence and to constrain its autonomy. While this formula for state
penetration applied to the post-colonial nations of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, it did not explain
the case for Tigray in Ethiopia, where the hierarchical society clashed with, instead of allying
with, the central state. We traced this outlying case to the specific history of Ethiopian statebuilding, in which dynastic politics and an imperial system severely undermined the potential for
cooperation between the Tigrayan periphery and the Amhara center.
Bearing in mind the outlier case of Tigray, the understanding of state penetration based
on social structures told us where the state is likely to come into close contact with rural
populations and become a principal authority over peasant livelihoods. By tracking state
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penetration according to group social structure, we could more methodically predict the location
of statist institutions, the other key variable in explaining where strong peasant movements take
hold. Working from Boone’s theory regarding the effects of statist institutions on peasant
politics, such institutions seemed likely to bring peasant movements into high-level political
arenas, all while grouping together diverse ethnicities. Statist rural institutions in theory would
shape peasant political activity to the specific form that the study sought to understand.
Where statist systems were fully articulated, and once conditions for mobilization were
met, peasant contestation took on the scope to challenge modern states. Indeed, in all of the cases
of scaled-up contestation, the movements elicited responses from central authorities. If the
outcomes for contestation strategies were fairly uniform, with peasant actors making claims on a
level that corresponded to the authority they targeted, there was slightly more variation in
outcomes for peasant political identities across cases. In Lower Casamance and in Côte d’Ivoire,
diverse ethnicities were grouped together in making claims on the state, but in the latter case
ethnic identity still had some relevance, given the influence of ethnic authorities in the semistatist system. In Tigray, the early stages of the TPLF’s movement emphasized ethnic identity,
although the tactical demands of challenging a centralized state caused diverse ethnicities to
come together; the practical conditions of politics under a system of direct rule eventually
outweighed the ideological significance of ethnicity. Regarding the character of peasant political
identity, the degree of traditional authority in the mobilized society largely determined the
importance of narrower identities. In the acephalous area of Lower Casamance, which
encountered a fully statist system, the MFDC did not valorize ethnic belonging; as mentioned
above, the electoral struggles on the cocoa frontier saw the mixing of ethnic and national
identities, in conjunction with a mixture of statist and traditional tenure systems; in Tigray, the
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cultural specificity and sense of ethnic pride that stemmed from a rigid organization of society
made ethno-nationalism a powerful force for the TPLF, at least in the initial stages of the
movement.
Given the outcomes for political identity and contestation, a predictive framework for
scaled-up, broad-based peasant movements must reserve space for close analyses of the balance
of traditional and state power in rural regions. In understanding the pull of these opposing forces,
the analyst, I believe, can gauge the extent to which peasant movements will be ethnically
inclusive and geared towards challenging regional or national authorities. At the same time, such
analyses need not start from scratch. The framework I presented, in which the centralization of
regional societies is used to roughly measure the penetration of statist land and agricultural
systems, lays the groundwork for predictions and explanations of vibrant peasant movements.
Moreover, it was confirmed by the post-colonial case studies and helped to orient the explanation
of the unique outcomes in Tigray.
Turning now to future research prospects, the framework could be further developed by
incorporating a geographical and ecological analysis of state-building. What types of terrain and
agriculture are accessible for states? Where is it easiest to escape from centralized authorities?
An understanding of the environmental conditions that restrict or facilitate state penetration and
control of populations could be used to extend the predictive scope of the framework.
Environmental factors certainly impact on the rural centralization variable, so they are therefore
meaningful to the explanatory depth of the theory. Additionally, it would be useful to analyze the
cultural and ideological aversion of decentralized groups to state power. What is the moral value
of remaining in an acephalous system, to those who belong to them? How do these convictions
motivate and inform resistance to central authorities? A closer analysis of the mentality of the

90

Diola and indigenous cocoa frontier populations could greatly augment the understanding of
center-periphery relations and peasant politics in those cases.
Finally, there is considerable need for contemporary analyses of the emerging peasant
movements, which, I believe, can be complemented by the theories laid out here. A number of
African states have in recent years facilitated land sales to corporate entities and the creation of
private agro-industrial development projects; such trends reflect the type of state interventions
that should cause peasant movements to rise to a national scale. While structural adjustment
reined in states’ capacity to intervene in the rural economy, centralized private actors have in
many cases filled some of the void left by the retrenchment of centralized public actors. Just as
peasants were seen responding to statist management, a similar trend is unfolding today as broad
rural movements advocate for their members’ rights in the face of massive land grabs.1 Peasant
movements are calling on states to protect small farmers, at risk of dispossession as larger actors
seek access to land. Moreover, the juxtaposition of foreign agro-industrial corporations with a
disempowered peasantry has the potential to incite a nationalism claiming the right to the state’s
protection from outside interests. Finally, global warming and soaring populations will continue
to put pressure on rural resources, heightening the possibility for contention and conflict. African
politics will be shaped by these trends; analysts, policymakers, and advocates that are equipped
to understand the emergence of peasant contention will be better positioned to respond to its
effects. In any case, the findings presented here indicate that peasant political action must not be
discounted even when it targets much larger actors. The processes leading to such contention and
the responses it produced are, I believe, grounds for a cautious optimism in the future of the
newly emerging peasant movements.

1

See Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, eds., Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America (London: Zed Books, 2005).
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